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Theory of the Nudnik:
The Future of Consumer Activism and
What We Can Do to Stop It
Yonathan A. Arbel*
Roy Shapira**
How do consumers hold sellers accountable and enforce market norms?
This Article contributes to our understanding of consumer markets in three
ways. First, the Article identifies the role of a small subset of consumers-the
titular "nudniks"-as engines of market discipline. Nudniks are those who call
to complain, speak with managers, post online reviews, and file lawsuits.
Typified by an idiosyncratic utility function and certain unique personality
traits, nudniks pursue action where most consumers remain passive. Although
derided in courtrooms and the court of public opinion, we show that nudniks
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at Berkeley, Chicago, DePaul, Emory, Haifa, IDC, Tel-Aviv, and Stanford for helpful comments
and discussions. McGavinn Brown, Bret Linley, Victoria Moffa, and Talya Yosphe provided
excellent research assistance. We collect examples of nudniks in action at our companion website,
Yonathan Arbel, Theory of the Nudnik, BATTLE FORMS (Feb. 1, 2019),
http://battleoftheforms.com/theory-of-the-nudnik/ [http://perma.cc/6GFS-JNTQ], and solicit
readers to contribute more examples.
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can solve consumer collective action problems, leading to broad market
improvements.
Second, the Article spotlights a disconcerting development: sellers'
growing usage of big data and predictive analytics allows them to identify
specific consumers as potential nudniks and then disarm or avoid selling to
them before they can draw attention to sellers'misconduct. The Article therefore
captures an understudied problem with big data tools: sellers can use these tools
to shield themselves from market accountability.
Finally, the Article evaluates a menu of legal strategies that would
preserve the benefits of nudnik-based activism in light of these technological
developments. In the process, we revisit the conventional wisdom on the
desirability of form contracts, mandatory arbitration clauses, defamation law,
and standing doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
Can consumers hold sellers accountable and enforce market
norms? This Article spotlights the disciplinary power of a small subset
of consumers, who we dub "nudniks."l Nudniks are those consumers
who call to complain, complete satisfaction surveys, demand to speak
with managers, post detailed online reviews, and file lawsuits. They
usually have an innate sense of justice, atypical motivations, or an
idiosyncratic utility function, which leads them to pursue action in
situations where most consumers remain passive. In courtrooms and in
the court of public opinion, nudniks are often derided as petty and
vindictive. Yet through their actions, nudniks direct attention to seller
underperformance, leading to a variety of legal and reputational
sanctions in ways that complement, and sometimes substitute, direct
legal intervention. The much-maligned nudniks can therefore generate
positive spillovers that reverberate throughout the economy.
Sellers, however, do not remain passive. They have long tried to
minimize the legal and reputational risks posed by nudniks. The advent
of big data and predictive analytics provides sellers with a game
changer: the ability to identify which consumer is a potential nudnik
(that is, which consumer is likely to complain publicly and draw
attention to seller underperformance), before that consumer even sets
foot in their store. Sellers can then silently disarm nudniks or avoid
selling to them altogether. This development benefits sellers, as it
reduces the legal and reputational risks from nudniks. It may even
benefit nudniks themselves, to the extent sellers disarm them by
offering them preferential treatment. Yet the development poses a large
risk to the greater consumer body, as it deprives consumers of a
valuable source of information on seller misbehavior, thereby reducing
the effectiveness of market discipline.
This Article's first contribution is to explore the role of the
nudniks as engines of market discipline that complement legal
institutions. Its second contribution is to shed light on sellers' growing
technological ability to circumvent nudniks and dilute market
1. The word nudnik derives from Yiddish. It can be roughly translated to "busybody" or
"nag." LION KOPPMAN & STEVE KOPPMAN, A TREASURY OF AMERICAN-JEWISH FOLKLORE 232 (First
Jason Anderson Inc. 1998) (1996) (defining a nudnik as a "pest, gossip, or busybody"); LEO ROSTEN,
THE NEW JOYS OF YIDDISH 272 (Lawrence Bush ed., 2001) (defining a nudnik as "[a] pest, a nag,
an annoyer, a monumental bore"). For more on terminology, see infra Section I.A.
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discipline. The Article's third contribution is to propose and evaluate
legal strategies that would protect the ability of nudniks to continue
generating valuable information on seller behavior.
To illustrate the nudnik phenomenon, consider the case of Ben
Edelman, a Harvard Business School professor. When Professor
Edelman ordered takeout from Sichuan Garden, a local Chinese
restaurant, he compared the prices on the receipt to the prices on the
online menu and discovered he was overcharged by $4. Annoyed,
Edelman sent a complaint through the restaurant's website, which he
then followed with an email. The owner responded that although the
website was not regularly updated, the current prices were accurately
printed on the in-restaurant menus. Although the owner stated that he
would fix the error, the correspondence suggests that he did not offer
Edelman compensation for the overcharge.2 In response, Edelman
demanded that he be compensated $12 for the mishap, citing a local
consumer protection law that trebles damages for unfair business
practices.3 When the owner refused, Edelman complained to the
relevant regulator. Eventually the overcharging story reached local
media. The public response largely mocked Edelman's insistence as
petty and privileged.4 It failed to recognize the important public service
Edelman provided: namely, deterring overcharging. Nor did the public
appreciate the fact that one has to be idiosyncratic to provide such a
public good. The opportunity cost of the time Edelman spent
complaining dwarves the $12 he sought. If it were not for people like
Edelman who go to the trouble, restaurants would have a much easier
time systematically overcharging us all.5
Whereas the legal literature has largely neglected the effects of
such nudnik-consumers,6 commercial firms have long invested
2. Hilary Sargent, Ben Edelman, Harvard Business Professor, Goes to War over $4 Worth of
Chinese Food, Bos. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.boston.com/culture/restaurants/2014/12/09/ben-
edelman-harvard-business-school-professor-goes-to-war-over-4-worth-of-chinese-food
[https://perma.cc/Y842-L7S5].
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2019).
4. Elizabeth Barber, A Harvard Professor Launched an Epic Rant over an Extra $4 on his
Chinese Takeout Bill, TIME (Dec. 10, 2014), http://time.com/3627282/harvard-professor-chinese-
takeout-ben-edelman/ [https://perma.cclG3P6-RYRM].
5. On March 1, 2019, we put on our investigative reporter hats and called the restaurant to
inquire about the entrde pricing, and we found that the prices indicated on the website match
exactly those offered by the restaurant. Telephone interview with Victoria Moffa, Research
Assistant, Univ. of Ala. (Mar. 1, 2019).
6. To the extent that legal scholars have touched these issues, it was usually within the
context of how the haves assert their rights more than the have-nots. In other words, existing
treatments focus on how sociodemographic differences between those who complain and those that
do not suppress the voices and concerns of marginalized groups. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Access
to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279 (2012); Lauren E. Willis,
Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1326 (2015).
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resources in identifying and minimizing their risks. Indeed, a rich
literature in marketing explores consumer complaining behavior and,
in particular, how to handle serial complainers.7 In recent years, sellers
have enjoyed a breakthrough in their ability to target and disarm
nudniks. Rather than dealing with nudniks as they complain, sellers
can use big data and predictive analytics to identify which of their
consumers are nudniks long before the nudniks even buy from them.
The early identification allows sellers to effectively silence these
nudniks by offering preferential treatment or avoiding servicing them
altogether. In other words, new technological tools allow sellers to
dampen the flow of negative information to the market and reduce the
risk of legal and reputational sanctions.
In this sense, the Article dovetails with the burgeoning legal
literature on big data and personalized contracts. The existing
literature has focused either on the promise of tailoring services to each
consumer's preferences or on concerns with privacy and
discrimination." In other words, the scholarship focuses on efficiency
and fairness considerations as they affect the individual receiving
personalized treatment. In contrast, this Article focuses on third-party
effects. As we show, these tools are increasingly effective at allowing
firms to escape market accountability.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains who the
nudniks are, what they do, and how they can, in some cases, generate
significant social benefits. Drawing on a number of examples, we show
that nudniks can effectively solve some of the collective action problems
that plague consumer markets; they take action even when a cold cost-
benefit analysis counsels inaction. We note that some of the nudniks'
actions can be frivolous or focus on parochial interests and that more
research is needed to identify the exact conditions under which nudniks
provide the most value. Yet, drawing on studies in the consumer
complaining behavior literature, we show why the impact that nudniks
have on seller behavior cannot be dismissed as immaterial or
predominately negative. Rather, the existing evidence indicates that
nudniks impose considerable market discipline. Traditional theories of
7. See infra Part I. Note, for example, the calls in the marketing literature to study nudniks
so "that businesses could identify individuals with this proclivity and steer them away from their
establishments." RICHARD L. OLIVER, SATISFACTION: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CONSUMER 402 (2d ed. 2015).
8. See Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmfiller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents,
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized
Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019); infra note 193.
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market discipline focus on consumers who read contracts.9 But recent
empirical studies suggest that very few consumers actually read
contracts.10 Thus, it will be productive for scholars and policymakers to
shift focus from those who read to those who complain. While serial
readers are almost mythical creatures, serial complainers are very real.
Part II switches attention from nudniks to the firms that deal
with them. This Part emphasizes the disconcerting development of
sellers' ability to identify and target nudniks earlier in the transaction
process. The earlier targeting limits the positive spillovers from
nudniks' complaints. Part II therefore dovetails with the longstanding
legal literature on private versus public resolution of disputes:
settlement versus trial, secrecy versus openness, and so on. While the
extant literature focuses on what happens when the consumer is in the
"claiming" stage (say, after she files her complaint), we show that new
technological tools allow sellers to dismiss the issue much earlier." The
ability to dissolve potential conflicts earlier may save some
administrative costs, but it comes at the expense of legal and
reputational deterrence. When a dissatisfied consumer posts a detailed
review online, the information may be forever etched in the internet's
memory, even if the consumer is later appeased. When the consumer
files a lawsuit, even if it is later settled, the filing leaves a public trail.
Prospective consumers and information intermediaries, such as
investigative reporters and consumer watchdogs, are able to pick up
these public indications of seller misbehavior and use them to inform
consumer decisions. By contrast, when the seller knows which
consumers are likely to post reviews and file complaints, and targets
these specific complainers before they even form their claims, this
aspect of reputational deterrence is undermined.
Part III develops legal strategies that would preserve nudnik-
based activism in light of these emerging technological threats. Unlike
most law and economics analyses, which invoke the prospect of
reputational deterrence as justification for scaling back legal
intervention, we argue that legal intervention may be required to
facilitate reputational deterrence. Permitting sellers to silence
complainers before their complaints reach the market weakens the
9. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979) (arguing that a
minority of consumers who read can enforce market discipline).
10. See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014). On the critiques of the Informed Minority Theory, see infra notes 87-
106.
ii. For the "naming, blaming, claiming" typology, see William L.F. Felstiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 631 (1980).
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functionality of the market for sellers' reputations. This Part shows why
existing frameworks for regulating big data and scoring algorithms are
ill-equipped to deal with the particular problem of nudnik targeting. We
then sketch concrete strategies for judges, regulators, and legislators,
such as relaxing standing requirements, amending defamation laws, or
closing loopholes in the Consumer Review Fairness Act.12
We conclude by reflecting on some of the broader lessons, such
as the underappreciated angers of personalizing contracts. Bottom-up
market discipline is an essential part of functioning markets, yet it
remains understudied in the legal literature. We seek to highlight one
specific aspect of market discipline, namely, how it benefits from the
efforts of a small subset of consumers. This aspect makes market
discipline vulnerable to technologies that allow the accurate and early
targeting of these consumers.
I. How NUDNIKs AFFECT SELLER BEHAVIOR
What makes a certain consumer a nudnik? And what is it exactly
that nudniks do-how do they affect seller behavior? This Part defines
nudniks and clarifies the role they play in enabling consumer markets
to function effectively.
Section A defines nudniks by juxtaposing them with prototypical
consumers. Nudniks are unlike the majority of consumers, who remain
passive both before entering a transaction (e.g., not reading the terms
of the contract) and after it (e.g., not noticing seller underperformance
or noticing but doing nothing about it). Nudniks also differ from other
active consumers in that their activism does not come from shopping for
the best deal ex ante but rather from demanding that their
transactional expectations be met ex post.13 To further underscore the
unique characteristics of nudniks, Section B provides motivating
examples of nudniks in action. Section C then categorizes the various
channels through which nudniks express their dissatisfaction with
sellers. Nudniks often voice their concerns about the seller publicly-
for example, by filing a lawsuit, posting a detailed negative review
online, or enlisting the help of the media. As a result, nudniks' actions
draw the attention of other market players, setting a reputational
sanction in motion and deterring seller misbehavior. Section D homes
12. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 45b).
13. Transactional expectations are the full set of expectations that consumers form about the
transaction. These expectations are informed by the contract, but also by seller representations,
advertisements, seller reputation, background knowledge, and life experience. See infra notes 112-
113 and accompanying text.
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in on the deterrence point by comparing our theory of the nudnik with
prevalent theories of market discipline and considering some of their
limitations. One key observation is that nudniks pressure sellers not
just to honor their contractual commitments but also to go beyond the
contract and meet supracontractual expectations.
A. Who Are the Nudniks?
What do we mean by "nudnik"? The term derives from Yiddish
and can be translated as "a bore, a nag, a jerk," or a "busybody" and a
"pest."14 We chose this term for our purposes precisely because it is
relatively unfamiliar. The abovementioned familiar terms carry strong,
negative connotations, whereas we wish to employ "nudnik" as a
judgment-neutral description of a certain type of consumer: one who is
constantly active in vindicating violations of her transactional
expectations of the seller.
A nudnik is someone who demands to speak with the manager,
writes an angry letter to the editor, or brings a lawsuit over a torn pair
of pants that cost $40. More precisely, the definition of "nudnik" for our
purposes is two-pronged: (1) an active consumer, (2) who acts even when
a cold cost-benefit analysis suggests otherwise. Nudniks act even when
others conclude that "it's not worth it" because they possess an
idiosyncratic utility function. Nudniks therefore belong to a broader
category that the socioeconomic literature dubs "willing punishers":
individuals who are willing to incur personal costs in order to punish
others who misbehave.15
Consider first the "active consumers" prong. Nudniks are unlike.
the overwhelming majority of consumers, who regularly remain
passive.16 These passivists-which is to say, most of us-engage with
14. KoPPMAN & KOPPMAN, supra note 1, at 232 ("[A] pest, gossip, or busybody."); Nudnik,
WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/nudnik (last visited May 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/NB7R-RTUS] ("[A] bore, a nag, a jerk."). On the long line of terms from the "legal
Yiddish" family tree, see Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Lawsuit, Shmawsuit, 103 YALE L.J. 463
(1993).
15. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 142 (2000) (discussing how certain individuals are "willing punishers": they engage in
costly sanctions to facilitate social control).
16. The marketing literature has long documented that most consumers remain passive.
LEON G. SCHIFFMAN & JOSEPH WISENBLIT, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 421 (11th global ed. 2015)
("Research indicates that only a few unsatisfied customers actually complain."); TECH. ASSISTANCE
RESEARCH PROGRAMS, U.S. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, CONSUMER COMPLAINT HANDLING IN
AMERICA: A FINAL REPORT (1979) [hereinafter TARP]; Stephen S. Tax & Stephen W. Brown,
Recovering and Learning from Service Failure, 40 MGMT. REV. 75, 77 (1988) (finding that ninety
percent of consumers do not complain); Clay M. Voorhees et al., A Voice from the Silent Masses:
An Exploratory and Comparative Analysis of Noncomplainers, 34 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 514,
514 (2006) ("The majority of dissatisfied customers fail to complain.").
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the product and service only at a basic level, both ex ante (when
shopping) and ex post (when feeling dissatisfied with the service or
product). When problems arise-the contractor did not show up on time,
the fridge is less energy efficient than advertised, or the medical bill
includes an unidentified small charge-the passivists may not notice,
or may notice but do nothing about it. At most, the passivist will refrain
from buying the same product again, passive-aggressively mention to
the contractor that he was expected earlier, or note her disappointment
to her immediate surroundings. As one marketing textbook
summarizes: "Consumers do not do anything, in the main, in response
to consumption."17
Why are so few consumers active? Many factors contribute to
passivism, including the opportunity cost of spending time to complain,
conflict aversion, personality type, and ignorance about one's rights.8
Importantly, remaining a passive consumer and free riding others'
efforts is often the rational thing to do-another example of the well-
documented rational apathy phenomenon we see with voters and
investors.19 After all, standing up for one's rights comes at immediate
costs. It involves social discord and may require a considerable
investment of time and effort.20 The benefits of taking such action, by
contrast, are uncertain. The seller may not yield to the consumer's
demands, and even if she does, the value of remedial action may not be
significant. In sum, the value of an uncertain replacement of a product
one complains about is often outweighed by the certain investment of
time and effort complaining.21
For most of us, what Ben Edelman did defies logic. The
opportunity cost of the time that Professor Edelman-a well-paid
speaker and consultant22-spent corresponding with the restaurant
17. OLIVER, supra note 7, at 385; see also John W. Huppertz, Firms' Complaint Handling
Policies and Consumer Complaint Voicing, 24 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 428, 428 (2007).
18. See, e.g., Robin M. Kowalski, Complaints and Complaining: Functions, Antecedents, and
Consequences, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 179 (1996) (examining how different personality types
experience the lodging of complaints); Marsha L. Richins, A Multivariate Analysis of Responses to
Dissatisfaction, 15 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 24 (1987).
19. On rational apathy among consumers, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 33 (1975), and Roger Van den Bergh & Louis
Visscher, The Preventive Function of Collective Actions for Damages in Consumer Law, 1 ERASMUS
L. REV. 5 (2008).
20. For a review of the marketing literature on the costs and benefits of complaints, see
Huppertz, supra note 17, at 429-30. To illustrate, in a study of 149 dissatisfied consumers who did
not complain, shortage of time was the leading professed reason for inaction. Voorhees et al., supra
note 16, at 519.
21. Huppertz, supra note 17, at 429-30.
22. See Biography, BEN EDELMAN, http://www.benedelman.org/bio/ (last visited May 7, 2020)
[https://perma.ccl45ZJ-HW73]; CV of Benjamin G. Edelman, BEN EDELMAN,
http://www.benedelman.org/cv.pdf (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z3JB-HR8V].
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was well in excess of the $12 he sought. For nudniks, however, spending
the time to assert their claim is simply the right and natural thing to
do.
This brings us to the second prong in the nudnik definition-
their unique makeup. These crusading consumers tend to share certain
values and innate personality traits. Studies in consumer psychology
find that certain consumers have traits that make them more "eager to
complain .. . while others ... simply hate the idea of complaining."23
Some of the serial complainers are simply more assertive and
aggressive than the rest of us. 2 4 Others have a strong level of
"commitment," meaning they hold certain things as extremely
important or, more concretely, have a strong innate belief that contracts
should be honored.25 Still others operate on spite: they are more prone
than others to feel that a seller providing inferior service or a defective
product is disrespecting them. In all, nudniks are consumers who
possess what an economist might call an "idiosyncratic utility
function":26 they are not wired like the rest of the consumer body. For
most of us, spending hours fighting a $4 overcharge is not worth .our
time; for nudniks, it comes instinctively-it is the "rational" thing to do.
Nudniks, then, are active. Yet not all active consumers are
nudniks. Within the category of active consumers, there are different
varieties.27 Some consumers are active in the sense that they take time
to read and understand each term in the contract. These consumers are
active shoppers, comparing not just the price and quality of the good or
service, but also the terms of the transaction.28 They will not fly with a
certain airline if it does not regularly compensate for delays and will
not go to car dealerships that do not offer warranties.
23. Min Gyung Kim et al., The Relationship Between Consumer Complaining Behavior and
Service Recovery: An Integrative Review, 22 INT'L. J. CONTEMP. HOSP. MGMT. 975, 978 (2010).
24. Richins, supra note 18, at 25 ("[C]onsumer assertiveness and aggression have recently
been recognized as correlates of complaint behavior.").
25. See Nancy Stephens & Kevin P. Gwinner, Why Don't Some People Complain? A Cognitive-
Emotive Process Model of Consumer Complaint Behavior, 26 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 172, 178
(1998).
26. See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan, Contracting in an Idiosyncratic Market, 14 BELL J. ECON.
338 (1983). To be sure, some nudniks may be motivated by material gains-compensation, future
discount, or "freebies"-but as the Edelman example illustrates, the value of the (private) gain
often pales in comparison to the effort required to earn it.
27. In a recent symposium on the future of private law, we offered a classification of various
consumer types and how they relate to consumer activism. See Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira,
Consumer Activism: From the Informed Minority to the Crusading Minority, 69 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors).
28. Such "shoppers" are usually the focus of economic theories of search behavior. See, e.g.,
Sara Fisher Ellison, Price Search and Obfuscation: An Overview of the Theory and Empirics, in
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICs RETAILING & DISTRIBUTION 287 (Emek Basker ed., 2016) (discussing
price search and its equilibrium effects).
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Unlike these shoppers, nudniks do most of their work post-
consumption. Rather than focusing on shopping for better contracts,
nudniks focus on enforcement. Whenever they feel wronged, nudniks
fight back, even when other types of active and sophisticated consumers
would not bother. To be sure, there is bound to be some categorical
overlap: some nudniks are also sophisticated and shop aggressively
before they purchase. But many nudniks often choose a product based
on a superficial comparison, the way most passivists do. This cursory
shopping effort does not preclude the nudnik from exerting maximum
effort when the product fails to meet her expectations.29
Nudniks are therefore part of the small subset of private
enforcers. A classic example here is class action plaintiffs (or, more
generally, "private attorneys general"),30 who through their
enforcement action can generate market discipline. Private attorneys
general are, in a sense, bounty hunters: they pursue action only when
a cold cost-benefit analysis justifies it. If the costs of collecting their
bounty become high-think, for example, about the recent rise of
mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers31-bounty
hunters stop enforcing. Nudniks, by contrast, fight against seller
underperformance almost instinctively, even at a personal cost, because
it is "in their blood." As such, nudniks can fill important gaps in legal
and market discipline.
B. What Nudniks Do: Motivating Examples
To provide some context for the nudnik phenomenon, let us
consider a few cases of nudniks in action and then highlight several
recurring themes.
Consider first the case of Hasan Syed, a Chicago businessman.
In 2013, British Airways lost Syed's father's luggage en route to Paris.32
29. On acting based on violated expectations see infra note 112 and accompanying text; see
also Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 550-51 (noting that consumers often have a good grasp
of some of the terms that govern their relationship with sellers, even without reading their
contract). Note that sophistication often leads to negative spillovers and cross-subsidies from less
sophisticated consumers. See generally Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke
Too Far, 83 CI.-KENT L. REV. 879, 890 (2008); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J.
ECON. 505 (2006); Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58
ARIz. L. REV. 213, 238-39 (2016). With nudniks, by contrast, partly because the activity is done at
the enforcement stage, the possibility of positive spillovers (as in drawing others' attention) is
greater.
30. See, e.g., Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives
from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1988).
31. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011).




Annoyed, Syed took his grievance to social media, where he tweeted the
following:
P'HVSVN
Don't fly with ((BritishAirways.
They can't keep track of your
luggage.
Promoted by
This otherwise common tweet had one uncommon twist: as seen
in the bottom left, the tweet was promoted by Syed. Syed paid Twitter
$1,000 to have this tweet and similar ones broadcasted to over seventy
thousand potential British Airways consumers.33 In a short time, the
wide exposure of his tweets drew the attention of mass media outlets,
which exponentially increased the exposure. Syed's efforts in airing his
grievances received their own term: "complaintvertising."34 His
guerrilla campaign bore fruit: British Airways located the luggage,
hand-delivered it to his dad in Paris, and issued a public apology.3 5 Syed
declared victory,36 while the company suffered substantial losses, and
its mishandling of Syed's original claim is now studied by marketing
scholars and practitioners.3 7
Similar tactics were used by Eugene Mirman, a comedian
annoyed with Time Warner Cable because they twice failed to show up
for their installation appointment.. Like Syed, Mirman invested in
widely disseminating his grievances. He took out a full-page
advertisement in the New York Press, where he mocked the company's
policy of failing to notify customers of rescheduled appointment times:
"Did Stalin ever call people before he arrested them and sent them to
May 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/73JT-PVXK] (reporting that Syed acknowledged his tweet as an
ad).
33. Hasan Syed (@HVSVN), TwITTER (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:46 PM), https://twitter.comI/HVSVN/
status/375026963347304449 [https://perma.cc/X5FH-6ERR; see also Kevin Foresti (@Kforesti),
TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2013, 9:08 AM), https://twitter.com/Kforesti/status/375289284276006912
[https://perma.cc[PF7J-FXZN].
34. Jason King, Complaintvertising: Word of Mouth's Evil Twin, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23,
2013, 1:14 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-king/complainvertising-word-of-b4143073
[https://perma.cc/EZ8M-2NPV].
35. See Angry Traveler Pays Big Bucks for Tweet, supra note 32.
36. Hasan Syed (@HVSVN), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2013, 9:56 PM), https://twitter.com/HVSVN/
status/375120159477755904 [https://perma.cclWRB6-5HVV].
37. See, e.g., Giselede Campos Ribeiro et al., The Determinants of Approval of Online
Consumer Revenge, 88 J. BUSINESS RES. 212 (2018).
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die in Siberian work camps? No! Why should Time Warner Cable have
a policy that is any different from Stalin's?"38
The Syed and Mirman examples showcase the idiosyncratic
utility function emblematic of nudniks. Both were willing to invest time,
effort, and valuable resources-at least $1,000 in Syed's case-to widely
disseminate their dissatisfaction, even though such an outlay far
outweighs the remedy they sought (getting the bag back or having the
cable guy show up on time). Syed was perhaps motivated by spite. With
Mirman, the idiosyncratic utility function probably stemmed from the
unique private benefits he gets from complaining publicly: his strong
interest in publicity.39 Others invest money to raise public awareness of
product and service issues because of their personal ideology. A case in
point is drywall pioneer and multimillionaire Phil Sokolof, who suffered
a heart attack at a young age and decided to spend millions on public
campaigns against the "McDonald'ses" of the world for using too much
fat in their products.40 Public opinion polls showed that Sokolof's
campaign got people to frequent the restaurants he targeted less and
eventually got the restaurants to change their products.41
Not all nudniks have money to purchase ads in national
newspapers. Some air their grievances by singing. When country music
artist Dave Carroll was frustrated with United Airlines for mishandling
and breaking his favorite guitar, he wrote a song and uploaded it to
38. Eugene Mirman, My Letter to Time Warner Cable, EUGENE MIRMAN (May 25, 2011),
http://www.eugenemirman.comlnews/2015/5/19/my-letter-to-time-warner-cable [https://perma.cc/
JQQ8-TLHM]. Mirman's efforts attracted attention, as they were reported on in the media. See,
e.g., Megan Angelo, This Guy Just Took Out a Full Page Ad to Tell Time Warner How Much They
Suck, Bus. INSIDER (May 26, 2011, 3:46 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/time-warner-cable-
eugene-mirman-ad-2011-5 [https://perma.cc/XZJ6-HCVC].
39. To be sure, the examples we use throughout this piece illustrate that there is no one
"classic" format of a nudnik: for some, the private benefits play a bigger role than for others. For
all of them, though, the cold cost-benefit calculation works differently than for most other
consumers.
40. Businessman Takes Out Ad Against Fast-Food Fat, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 5, 1990),
https://www.deseret.com/1990/4/5/18854935/businessman-takes-out-ad-against-fast-food-fat
[https://perma.cclJT57-SPA4]; Marcella S. Kreiter, Group Accuses McDonald's of 'Poisoning'
America, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Apr. 4, 1990), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/04/04/Group-
accuses-McDonalds-of-poisoning-America/3593639201
6 00/ [https://perma.cclNWB2-9UV7].
41. See Scott Hume, Fast-Food Faces Wary Public, ADVERT. AGE, July 2, 1990, at 1 (noting
the decline in people willing to frequent these restaurants). Shortly after the aforementioned
public opinion polls, McDonald's announced the switch from animal fat to vegetable oil for its fries.
For reviews of Sokolof's campaign that include criticisms and objections, see Ronald J. Adams &
Kenneth M. Jennings, Media Advocacy: A Case Study of Philip Sokolof's Cholesterol Awareness
Campaigns, 27 J. CONSUMER AFF. 145 (1993), and Malcolm Gladwell, McDonald's Broke My Heart,
REVISIONIST HIST., http://revisionisthistory.com/episodes/19-mcdonalds-broke-my-heart (last
visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YD77-4JCC].
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YouTube.42 His "United Breaks Guitars" song went viral, reaching
number one on the iTunes Music Store and earning over nineteen
million views as of this writing.43 Here as well, mainstream media
picked up the story and widely publicized it. United suffered a huge
reputational hit; some estimated that the incident led to a ten percent
decline in its market capitalization.4 4 Beyond compensating Carroll,
United reacted by committing to change its customer service policy, and
it now uses Carroll's video in its internal trainings.45
Nudniks who do not have deep pockets or a singing talent can
still go to great lengths to disseminate their claims through other
channels-for example, by enlisting the help of mass media. When
Philadelphians Diana and Jason Airoldi were frustrated with Comcast
for skirting appointments for six weeks, they called a local journalist.46
The reporter ran a story about their travails and called the mother of
Comcast's CEO to complain about her son's company's behavior.47 The
paper followed up with an update when Comcast subsequently changed
its ways.48
42. See United Breaks Guitars, DAVE CARROLL MUSIC, https://www.davecarrollmusic.com/
songwriting/united-breaks-guitars/?v=7516fd43adaa (l st visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
5GAV-4SXF].
43. See David Dunne, United Breaks Guitars, JOSEPH L. ROTMAN SCH. MGMT.,
https://3gz8rnlntxn33t9p22lv8mlgtsq-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/United-
Breaks-Guitars-Case-Jan-11-10-21.pdf (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.ccl9M42-PCVA]
(prepared by Dunne as a case study for in-class discussion).
44. See Eddie Wrenn, The Sweet Music of Revenge: Singer Pens YouTube Hit After United
Airlines Breaks His Guitar ... and Shares Plunge 10%, DAILY MAIL (July 24, 2009, 9:12 AM),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1201671/Singer-Dave-Carroll-pens-YouTube-hit-
United-Airlines-breaks-guitar-shares-plunge-10.html [https://perma.cc/3CEQ-5P85]; see also
Allison R. Soule, Fighting the Social Media Wildfire: How Crisis Communication Must Adapt to
Prevent from Fanning the Flames 35-49 (2010) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with authors) (detailing the sentiment in YouTube comments
about the United Airlines smashed guitar incident).
45. See Broken Guitar Song Gets Airline's Attention, CBC NEWS (July 8, 2009, 3:00 PM),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/entertainment/broken-guitar-song-gets-airline-s-attention-1.802741
[https://perma.cclK8KX-S4AP]. Carroll's is not the only case of a consumer holding sellers
accountable by singing. When Bank of America customers were frustrated with how the bank
stealthily delayed mortgage approvals, they posted a video of themselves singing a plea to hear
back. The musical plea was successful, and the bank issued a public apology, closed the loan, and
offered monetary compensation. See Christina Ng, Georgia Couple Pleads with Bank of America
in Music Video, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/2011/12/
georgia-couple-pleads-with-bank-of-america-in-music-video/ [https://perma.cc/U837-V7NUI.
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All these examples (and otherS49) showcase four recurring
themes. We already highlighted the first one, namely, how nudniks
have idiosyncratic utility functions: they will take action even when the
costs far outweigh the immediate financial benefits. Second, because of
their idiosyncratic utility functions, nudniks tend to be repeat players.
Professor Edelman did not just target Sichuan Garden; according to
some reports, he had previously complained about various other
"misbehaving" restaurants in the Boston area.50 Syed and Mirman
reportedly have a history of complaintvertising against various
companies.51 Sokolof did not just spend $3 million on ads against
McDonald's; he went on to campaign against other companies as well,
spending $15 million overall.52
A third recurring theme, which is probably also attributed to
nudniks' idiosyncratic makeups, is that they are quite often derided by
the public. To return to our opening example, Professor Edelman was
widely mocked for being petty, privileged, and ruthless.53 Even
academics often refer to nudniks in pejorative terms, such as
49. At the risk of stating the obvious, we note that most nudniks' efforts go unreported, as
their daily actions against underperforming sellers rarely receive widespread media attention. The
reader can probably summon ample examples from her own personal experience with nudniks in
her close and intermediate circles.
50. In one case, Edelman presented a discount coupon at a sushi restaurant, and when the
restaurant refused to honor it, he threatened that he would write to the Boston Licensing Board
to have their food and liquor licenses revoked. See Hilary Sargent, There's More: Edelman Did this
Before, and Worse, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.boston.comlculture/restaurants/
2014/12/10/theres-more-edelman-did-this-before-and-worse [https://perma.cc/KG96-NEPK].
51. See, e.g., Will Robinson, Bob's Burgers Voice Actor Eugene Mirman Buys Newspaper Ad
to Bemoan Parking Ticket, ENT. WKLY. (July 14, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://ew.com/article/
2015/07/14/bobs-burgers-eugene-mirman-parking-ticket/ [h tps://perma.cc/SBJ2-W923] (reporting
that Mirman used a full newspaper advertisement to publicize his disappointment in a $15 parking
ticket); Best Full Page Ad Ever, IMGUR (July 12, 2015), https://imgur.com/xjrCG0E
[https://perma.cc/GL8Z-VCCD] (depicting Mirman's complaint about an unreasonable $15 parking
ticket); Hasan Syed (@HVSVN), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2013, 4:07 PM),
https://twitter.com/HVSVN/status/391309476617154560 [https://perma.cc/5SXL-7LDR] ("Before
you use @Square Cash, read about their horrible customer service here bit.ly/nCcLxl.").
52. Wolfgang Saxon, Phil Sokolof, 82, a Crusader Against Cholesterol, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/17/us/phil-sokolof-82-a-crusader-against-
cholesterol-is-dead.html [https://perma.cc/5X4S-Q9CQ].
53. See Nathan J. Robinson, Stop Eviscerating the Harvard Professor Who Threatened to Sue
a Chinese Restaurant Over $4. He Has a Point., NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 13, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/120558/ben-edelman-harvard-prof-angry-over-4-overcharge-has-
point [https://perma.cclUB33-CP9T] ("By now even Ben Edelman thinks Ben Edelman is fairly
despicable.... The consensus is that he's a cheap, entitled bully and that the immigrant
restaurant owner is a hapless victim.").
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"squawk[ers]"54 or "terrorists."5 5 Notwithstanding this public derision,
a fourth recurring theme is that nudniks' efforts tend to generate
positive spillovers that benefit the entire consumer body, including
those who mock them. In the abovementioned examples, the targeted
companies did not just compensate the specific nudnik, but also
apologized publicly and implemented policy changes.
To be sure, not all nudnik activities benefit other consumers.
Some nudniks raise frivolous complaints. Others voice legitimate
concerns but their voices do not echo enough to reach others and effect
change. To better understand when and how nudniks create positive
spillovers, we now move to categorizing nudniks' various modes of
operation.
C. How Nudniks'Activity Impacts Sellers
How do consumers react to seller failure? Lawyers naturally
tend to think about the aggrieved consumer's legal options: Does she
have a case? Would the seller settle? Is the expected recovery likely to
offset the costs of filing a lawsuit? Outside the legal literature, however,
awaits an entire body called consumer complaining behavior ("CCB")
literature, which studies how consumers respond to failure in ways
other than litigation.56 When a consumer feels dissatisfied with her
purchase, she faces an action/no-action decision. Those that decide to
act face a second-level choice on how to act. Most act privately; that is,
they do not buy the product anymore.5 7 They act without confronting
others. A small minority of dissatisfied consumers decides to act more
publicly and does confront others.58 They then face a third-level choice:
either seek redress from the company directly, as in talking to the
manager, or air their grievances outside, as in notifying a regulator,
filing a lawsuit, or posting a negative review online.
54. See Jack Dart & Kim Freeman, Dissatisfaction Response Styles Among Clients of
Professional Accounting Firms, 29 J. BUS. RES. 75, 75-76 (1994) (analogizing customer complaints
to "the firm, authorities, or media" to a "squawk").
55. See SCHIFFMAN & WISENBLIT, supra note 16, at 44. ("The Terrorists are customers who
have had negative experiences with the company and spread negative word-of-mouth. Companies
must take measures to get rid of terrorists.").
56. Hirschman's model of voice, exit, and loyalty is perhaps the most familiar to legal
scholars. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). Other models are less
familiar to us but even more influential in the CCB literature. See, e.g., Ralph L. Day & E. Laird
Landon, Jr., Toward a Theory of Consumer Complaining Behavior, in CONSUMER AND INDUSTRIAL
BUYING BEHAVIOR 425 (Arch G. Woodside et al. eds., 1977).
57. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 30-43 (noting that in the consumer markets context, "exit"
is far more prevalent than "voice").
58. See Kowalski, supra note 18; Richins, supra note 18.
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The type of consumer response that generates the most positive
spillovers is airing one's grievances publicly. Airing it out publicly
informs other consumers and helps them calculate their decisions. Yet
public confrontation requires much more effort than "[p]ersonal
boycotting,"59 so most consumers avoid it. Nudniks, with their
idiosyncratic utility functions, do not. Most consumers stop at the first
level by deciding not to act. Many others halt at the second level by
deciding to act without confronting others. Nudniks, by contrast, do not
fear the confrontation and go all the way. As a byproduct, their actions
diffuse information about seller behavior and allow other consumers to
decide with whom they want to keep doing business and with whom
they do not.
1. Facilitating Introspection by Sellers
Albert Hirschman famously introduced the notions of "voice"
and "exit." 6 0 Voicing dissatisfaction is not a nudnik-specific action.
Many of us passive consumers occasionally employ voice, as in telling
our waiter that the dish we ordered was not cooked to our liking. What
distinguishes nudniks (besides using their voices more frequently) is
that they are more likely to escalate their complaints up the
organization's ladder. They do not stop at the bulwark of the front
desk.61
Exit, the quintessential private action, is similarly not unique to
nudniks. Many passive consumers will stop purchasing from a seller
who disappointed them and will switch to a competitor. What separates
nudniks from passivists is the degree to which they are willing to go
when exiting. Most passive consumers would not exit in concentrated
markets, where there are few viable alternatives (and thus no
competitors to switch to).6 2 Nudniks, with their unique convictions and
preferences, will. Consider for example Drew Weaver, a Coloradan who
was annoyed by his internet provider's data overage charges. The fact
that Weaver did not have any viable alternatives in his area did not
59. See Claire P. Bolfing, How Do Customers Express Dissatisfaction and What Can Service
Marketers Do About It?, J. SERVS. MARKETING, Spring 1989, at 5, 7.
60. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56.
61. Amy Schmitz summarized the barriers to meaningful voice thusly: "Anger may fuel a
consumer's initial e-mail, phone call, or negative online review, but consumers generally do not
follow up after receiving no reply or facing long hold times on customer service phone lines."
Schmitz, supra note 29, at 233. Nudniks are more persistent in following up.
62. See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard et al., "Can You Hear Me Now?" Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
Under Increasing Competition, 58 J.L. & EcON. 717, 718 (2015) ("Consumers' discipline of firms is




stop him from making the principled decision to disconnect from
internet services altogether.63
By escalating their voices (or exiting in unusual circumstances),
nudniks can lead to a change in the seller's policies.64 High-level
managers or owners are not always aware of failures in their own
organizations. The nudnik's voice may alert top decisionmakers to
underperformance among lower-level employees, failures in product
lines, or changes in consumer preferences and market conditions.65 In
these scenarios, nudniks are effectively providing free monitoring
services for sellers, which may in turn lead to meaningful introspection
and reform in seller practices. Indeed, marketing scholars have long
recognized the value (to sellers) of feedback that nudniks generate.66 A
concrete example comes from Amazon's Jeff Bezos, who made his email
address publicly available and actively monitors it, calling on
dissatisfied buyers to reach out directly to him and flush out problems
he may not be aware of in his giant organization.67
In other words, nudniks' loud voices can serve as a much-needed
wake-up call, which benefits the seller and, by extension, passive
buyers.
Still, all too often the problem is not that sellers inadvertently
underperform, but rather that they deliberately save costs by cutting
corners.68 In these scenarios, keeping the complaint in-house would not
bring improvement in seller behavior. This is where the more potent
channels of nudnik behavior enter: airing grievances publicly.
63. See Jon Brodkin, Comcast Said He Used Too Much Data-So He Opted to Live Without
Home Internet, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 15, 2017, 8:41 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/09/a-comcast-data-cap-tale-unexplained-overage-drives- man-to-cancel-service/
[https://perma.cc/DXN9-MXL7].
64. To be sure, individual exit in itself may not be enough, but unusual and visible exit could
sometimes lead to a cascade of exits or a consumer boycott. See MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER
BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 1-21 (1999)
(discussing the basic mechanics of consumer boycotts).
65. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 31.
66. See, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 23, at 980 ("[S]ervice providers are advised to encourage
consumers to lodge complaints in order to have an opportunity to recover from the failure.").
67. See Catherine Clifford, The Brilliant Business Lesson Behind the Emails Jeff Bezos Sends
to His Amazon Executives with a Single '?', CNBC (May 7, 2018, 1:37 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/07/why-jeff-bezos-stillreads-the-emails-amazon-customers-send-
him.html [https://perma.cc/SC3A-EZM8] ("[T]he tech executive still has a customer-facing email
address at Amazon, because hearing from consumers helps him identify pain points."). Another
example comes from Sheraton Hotels, which reportedly provided financial compensation to
consumers who voiced their concerns to the hotel's managers. Stephanie Paterik, Sheraton Plans
to Burnish Image by Paying Guests for Bad Service, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 6, 2002, 12:07 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl031256929121917755 [https://perma.cclYJG8-UNAR].
68. See OLIVER, supra note 7, at 385 (summarizing work in marketing on how too often
management actually opts to "shield itself from the onus of complaint data").
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2. Facilitating Legal and Reputational Sanctions Against Sellers
Nudniks express their concerns publicly, and alert others in the
process, through four primary channels.
First, nudniks can litigate their grievances. Although every
consumer can file a lawsuit for breach, few do.69 After all, most breaches
of consumer contracts involve sums that are too low to justify litigation.
As Judge Posner quipped, "only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."7 To
solve this problem, commentators have proposed a litany of measures:
class actions, punitive damages, waiving fees, subsidizing legal
representation, shifting attorney's fees to the winning party, changing
burdens of proof, and so on.7 1 Yet each of these measures is too imperfect
or malleable to dramatically alter the cost-benefit analysis so that filing
small-yet-meritorious claims would become common. Nudniks, by
contrast, do not rely on these measures-they may invest in litigating
their claim out of their strong sense of principle, spite, or ideology,
disregarding the monetary cost-benefit calculation. Once nudniks file a
lawsuit, they are also the type of plaintiffs who will not readily accept
a settlement offer.72
When nudniks air their grievances in public courtrooms, they
not only contribute to the development of decisional law and legal
deterrence, but also create a public record of seller behavior, thereby
contributing to better reputational deterrence. Litigating their claims,
even when small and seemingly petty, produces information about
seller behavior, which in turn helps other consumers decide from whom
they want to purchase.73
69. See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits.").
70. Id.
71. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts, 71 VAND. L. REV.
121, 157-71 (2018) (reviewing initiatives designed to increase consumer participation).
72. See Julie Macfarlane, Why Do People Settle?, 46 McGILL L. J. 663 (2001) (highlighting
litigants' nonfinancial motivations to reject settlements).
73. We come back to this point later, in Section II.B. The idea is that even if the media does
not report on any small-claim litigation, the mere filings of such lawsuits by nudniks create a
public database of seller misbehavior. Court documents allow investigative reporters to engage in
what they call "pattern-identifying." See Roy Shapira, Law as Source: How the Legal System
Facilitates Investigative Journalism, 37 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 210 (2018) [hereinafter Shapira,
Law as Source] ("We learned from interviews, tip sheets, and successful investigative projects, that
pattern-identifying is perhaps the most important way in which the legal system helps
investigative reporters."). On the link between legal and reputational sanctions, see also Scott
Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly Legal Sanctions Can Work Better
than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2018), and Roy Shapira, Reputation Through
Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1193 (2016) [hereinafter Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation].
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Second, nudniks often enlist the help of the media. For example,
when a consumer named Liz found an unexpected charge for the safe in
her hotel room (supposedly to cover the costs of a warranty for the safe's
content), she approached NBC and complained. "[I]t's totally sneaky,"
she said, arguing that the hotel should have informed her of the charges
"up front."7 4 Her story led to a full-blown investigative report of hidden
fees in hotels.75 Liz's charges were reversed, many other consumers
were forewarned, and other hotels observed the reputational backlash
that such practices can create.76
From a journalist's perspective, such tips and stories provide a
valuable source of interesting stories about seller misconduct-an
"information subsid[y]."" Yet most dissatisfied consumers do not share
their stories with the media, either because they do not have the time
or do not wish to risk their privacy and potential confrontations with
disgruntled sellers. It often takes a nudnik to jumpstart media scrutiny.
A third potential venue for dissatisfied consumers is
complaining to the regulator.78 In some circumstances, complaining to
the regulator can prove advantageous to the complainer, so even non-
nudniks engage in it. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB"), for example, collects consumer complaints, routes them to the
company, and then follows up to make sure the company responds
properly.79 In many other instances, however, complaints to the
regulator do not result in private benefits to the consumer. The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), for instance, explicitly informs consumers





77. For example, NBC4 Washington invites consumers to share issues with the promise that
we are responding to EVERY consumer issue!" See Do You Have a Consumer Issue to Report? Tell
NBC4 Responds!, NBC4 WASH., https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/NBC4-Responds-
Consumer-Complaint-IssueReport-Susan-Hogan-378873701.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2019,
10:49 AM) [https://perma.cc/49FV-THLG]. On the "information subsidies" term and its relevance,
see Shapira, Law as Source, supra note 73, at 166-67, explaining that "information subsidies" are
"stories provided to newsrooms by insiders, public relations departments, think tanks, NGOs, and
the like."
78. The argument in this paragraph can extend to "private regulators," such as the Better
Business Bureau, which collects as many as 800,000 complaints annually. See US BBB 2018
Statistics, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/globalassets/local-bbbs/council-
113/medialcomplaint-stats/2018/us-bbb-2018-statistics-complaints.pdf (last visited May 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cclWM48-CYCY]. For more on private handling of complaints, see Rory Van Loo,
The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547 (2016).
79. See Learn How the Complaint Process Works, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/process/ (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.ccl
N9RB-UJGS] ("We'll forward your complaint and any documents you provide to the company and
work to get a response from them.").
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that it "cannot resolve individual consumer complaints."80 Complaining
under these conditions is costly to the complainer. So most consumers
do not invest the time in complaining, even though complaining would
be beneficial for society by facilitating better-informed regulations,
helping the regulator warn other market participants, and shaming
underperforming sellers.8 1 It takes consumers with idiosyncratic utility
functions-nudniks-to initiate such privately costly yet socially
beneficial complaints.
Finally, nudniks engage in the production and dissemination of
peer-to-peer eputational information.82 Consumers increasingly rely on
online customer reviews when making purchasing decisions.
83
Consumers often do read and engage with other consumers' reviews,
unlike the fine print.84 Yet most consumers who are dissatisfied with
their purchases do not share their dissatisfaction online. One study, for
example, estimates that only fifteen in a thousand consumers produce
reviews.85 Of these reviewers, only a handful include a detailed
description of what exactly went wrong, thus making most reviews
minimally informative.86 The upshot, again, is that an important
80. See Submit a Consumer Complaint to the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc (last visited May 7,
2020) [https://perma.cc/6WFA-NBWL]; see also Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State:
Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019).
81. For a discussion about regulators' increased reliance on publicizing complaints online, see
Nathan Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2018).
82. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in Consumer
Markets, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1239, 1254-55 (2019) ("While everyone benefits from having
this public resource, producers of reputational information are not directly compensated for their
contributions."); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 303, 316-
20 (2008) ("[L]ate recognition of biased [contractual] terms will not change the vendors' actions
vis-a-vis other consumers-unless the information concerning the transaction flows from the
aggrieved consumer to the ex ante consumers contemplating a transaction with the same vendor.").
83. See Michael Anderson & Jeremy Magruder, Learning from the Crowd: Regression
Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database, 122 ECON. J. 957, 983 (2012).
84. See, e.g., How Online Reviews Influence Sales, SPIEGEL RES. CTR. 2,
https://spiegel.medill.northwestern.edu/-pdf/Spiegel-Online%20Review BookJun2017_FINAL.
pdf (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z7WZ-L3NV] (reporting that nearly ninety-five
percent of shoppers read reviews before shopping); Local Consumer Review Summary 2019,
BRIGHT LOCAL (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.brightlocal.com/researchlocal-consumer-review-
survey/ [https://perma.cc/J4Z3-BJ94] (putting that number at eighty-two percent of shoppers who
read reviews when considering shopping at local businesses).
85. See Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Reviews Without a Purchase: Low Ratings,
Loyal Customers, and Deception, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 249, 251 (2014).
86. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Online Reviews: The
Trouble with Trolls and a Role for Contract Law After the Consumer Review Fairness Act, 53 GA.
L. REV. 549, 553-54 (2019) (illustrating the difficulty of distinguishing between helpful (factual)
and unhelpful ("uninhibited, over-the-top hyperbole") reviews); Max Woolf, A Statistical Analysis
of 1.2 Million Amazon Reviews, MAX WOOLF'S BLOG (June 17, 2014), http://minimaxir.com/2014/
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mechanism of market governance-online reviews-is carried by the
efforts of a small subset of consumers who are willing to incur the costs:
nudniks.
To be sure, these channels of voicing dissatisfaction are
disparate: some, such as litigation, require much higher private and
social costs than others, such as posting reviews online. We group them
together here to underscore one crucial yet underappreciated point: the
overwhelming majority of consumers do not engage with any of these
channels. To the extent that these channels carry information on seller
behavior, it is largely through the work of a small subset of consumers-
nudniks.
Through all these channels of voicing dissatisfaction, nudniks
are an engine of market discipline. If restaurants can systematically
overcharge $4 without anyone contesting such a practice, they have
little incentive to reform. Nudniks, through various modes of action,
make restaurants pay for illicit practices. Nudniks hold sellers
accountable, thereby potentially benefiting the broader, mostly passive
consumer body. Our claim is not that every nudnik's complaint
necessarily produces value, but rather that some do. Nudnik-type
activism is therefore an important, understudied aspect of market
discipline.
D. Relation to the Extant Literature and Limitations
To further shed light on nudniks' contribution, this Section
juxtaposes nudnik-driven activism with other theories of market
discipline, such as the informed minority theory and the reputational
discipline theory. This Section then highlights several limitations of
nudnik-based activism.
1. From an "Informed Minority" to Nudniks
Perhaps the most influential theory of market discipline has
been Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde's "informed minority theory."87
The theory concedes that many consumers are too uninformed and
06/reviewing-reviews/ [https://perma.ccl5F8C-3G5G] (finding that only ten percent of reviews
studied had a minimum of ten helpfulness data points).
87. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 9. On the theory's influence, see R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey
J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect
Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 647-48 (1996).
950
2020] THEORY OF THE NUDNIK 951
insufficiently sophisticated to fend for themselves. This does not mean,
however, that markets should be regulated. Schwartz and Wilde argued
that as long as a minority of consumers reads and negotiates contract
terms, contracts will reflect the preferences of most consumers,
including those who do not read the fine print.88 The idea is that if the
minority is sufficiently large to surpass a critical mass, then firms will
find it worthwhile to compete over this segment of the market. And
because firms tend to offer standard form contracts, the only way a firm
can win the hearts of the informed minority segment is by offering
better terms across the board.89 The informed minority theory quickly
gained prominence, becoming the lynchpin of economic analyses of
consumer law.90
Yet in recent years there has been a growing realization that the
assumptions underlying the theory may be unrealistic. A growing body
of research shows that the number of consumers who read the fine
print, at least in online contracts, is so small that it is unlikely to reach
a critical mass.91 This is not surprising-reading contracts is a time-
intensive activity that people dislike, with uncertain and often
marginal benefits.92 Further, in recent decades there has been a steady
increase in the volume and length of contracts and disclosures, making
reading and comprehending almost impossible.93 Accordingly, many
88. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 9, at 638 ("The presence of at least some consumer
search in a market creates the possibility of a 'pecuniary externality': persons who search
sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms.").
89. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1347 ("If a small group of consumers reads warranties and selects among products according to
warranty content, manufacturers may be forced to draft warranties responsive to the group's
preferences, even though the large majority of consumers generally neglect warranty terms.").
90. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 87; Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of
the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2102 n.77 (2014) (compiling references).
91. See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2014) ("We find that the fraction of consumers
who read such contracts is so small that it is unlikely that an informed minority alone is shaping
software license terms."). We elaborate on the flaws of the informed minority theory in Arbel &
Shapira, supra note 27.
92. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the 'Opportunity to Read' in Contract Law, 5 EUR.
REV. CONT. L. 1, 15 (2009) (discussing the burdens of reading and how not reading is actually the
rational decision); Yonathan A. Arbel & Andrew Toler, All-Caps 4 (Ala. Working Paper Series
3519630, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3519630 [https://perma.cc/
WDB2-P27D] (discussing ways to make reading terms and conditions more bearable). Even the
use of conspicuous formatting to highlight terms does not seem to improve matters for consumers.
See Ben-Shahar, supra (finding, in a series of experiments, that capitalization of key clauses in
consumer contracts fails to improve consumer outcomes).
93. See 0MRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN You WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 94-101 (2014) (discussing the "accumulation problem" of
disclosures and how they "compete with each other for people's time and attention"); WENDY
WAGNER ET AL., INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 49 (2019) ("[I]n some cases the law even encourages sellers
to be more incomprehensible, rather than less.").
952 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:929
have abandoned the informed minority theory.94 Even Schwartz himself
seems to concede it is unrealistic.95
A related prominent theory is the reputational discipline theory.
This theory holds that sellers will sometimes perform even beyond the
letter of the contract in order to build their reputation and brand
name.96 On this view, one-sided clauses give the firm the power-but
not the obligation-to perform the contract in a self-serving way. Firms
have incentives to go beyond the contract and often do.97 While we agree
that reputational considerations shape seller behavior, the reputational
discipline theory is too simplistic, resting on unrealistic assumptions of
consumer learning and consumer sharing.98 The theory sweeps critical
issues under the rug: How is it exactly that quality reputational
information emerges? Who creates it? Who widely disseminates it?
Quality reputation information is, in a sense, a public good.99 Private
players often do not have the right incentives (or ability) to create and
disseminate this public good.100 As a result, reputational information is
too often unreliable; the market overreacts to certain types of seller
misbehavior and underreacts to others.101
In sum, there is a vacuum in theories of bottom-up market
discipline. Both prevalent theories-informed minority and
94. See BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 52 (2012) ("Electronic
contracting has raised doctrinal and practical problems that were not resolved well by existing
law."); Zamir, supra note 90, at 2102-03 ("Outside of the law-and-economics community, most
people would quite confidently say . .. that hardly a soul reads standard-form contracts.").
95. See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 552 ("[T]he state should jettison the disclosure
project of making all terms accessible to consumers with the expectation that consumers can read
the entire document.").
96. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2006) ("A seller concerned about its reputation
can be expected to treat consumers better than is required by the letter of the contract."); Jason
Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts
Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858
(2006) ("[A] firm will often provide benefits ... beyond those that its standard form obligates it to
provide .... Firms do this because they have an interest in building and maintaining cooperative,
value-enhancing relationships with their customers.").
97. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Minding the Gap, 51 CONN. L. REV. 69, 90-91
(2019) (explaining that firms often account for characteristics like consumer power, emotion, and
sophistication when determining whether to go beyond the terms of a contract).
98. Others have criticized the reputational discipline theory on other grounds, such as
fairness. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir & Yuval Farkash, Standard Form Contracts: Empirical Studies,
Normative Implications, and the Fragmentation of Legal Scholarship, 12 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL
STUD. 137, 162-67 (2015) (warning, for a number of reasons, against an entire reliance on the
reputational discipline theory).
99. See Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation, supra note 73, at 1211.
100. Id.
101. See generally Arbel, supra note 82, at 1286-87 (noting that informational distortions can
lead companies to either overreact or underreact to certain feedback); Shapira, Reputation
Through Litigation, supra note 73, at 1203-11.
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reputational discipline-suffer from key theoretical and empirical
flaws. The theory of nudnik-based activism, by contrast, escapes these
flaws. Nudniks' unique makeup and modes of operation make them a
more robust vector of market discipline for the following four reasons.
First, nudnik-based activism does not require a critical mass of
active consumers to effect change in seller behavior. One nudnik may
be enough. In the informed minority theory, the mechanism that brings
about change is market competition over the purses of active
consumers. The theory therefore requires a critical mass of comparison
shoppers, or else it would not be worthwhile for sellers to compete over
them.102 One comparison shopper electing to purchase elsewhere is not
enough. With nudniks, by contrast, the mechanisms that bring about
change are reputational and legal. In today's interconnected world, a
single nudnik's squawk can reach numerous other consumers and
convince them to take their business elsewhere.103 The threat of
reputational sanctions, in turn, makes sellers change their behavior ex
ante.104 YouTube allowed a single man-Dave Carroll-to call the
mighty United Airlines to order. Twitter helped another-Hassan
Syed-make British Airways apologize and change their practices.
To be sure, one nudnik will not always be enough. In fact,
sometimes even several nudniks and their repeated public complaints
may not be enough to solve market pathologies. Our claim here is more
modest: sellers care about their reputation and realize that one
complaining consumer may be enough to put reputational sanctions in
motion. Indeed, this is a recurring theme among marketing scholars
and reputation practitioners: beware of the single active consumer.105
102. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL
THEORETICAL ECON. 94, 98 (2012) ("If this critical mass of comparison shoppers exists, disclosure
will be effective in sufficiently competitive markets, because sellers will have an incentive to satisfy
the informed buyers.").
103. See Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 345,
395 (2014) ("[A] handful of disgruntled consumers can seriously affect [firms'] reputations and
their businesses.").
104. Nudniks' complaints may also generate nonreputational disciplinary effects, such as
creating psychological pressures on sellers. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509-10 (2002)
(reviewing psychological studies on workers that demonstrate the significant demoralizing effects
of complaints).
105. See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Reputation Mechanisms, in 1 HANDBOOKS IN INFORMATION
SYSTEMS: ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 629, 639 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006)
(explaining that, in some circumstances, "even a single negative rating on a seller's feedback
history reveals the fact that the seller is not honest"); Corn6 Dijkmans et al., A Stage to Engage:
Social Media Use and Corporate Reputation, 47 TOURISM MGMT. 58, 59 (2015) ("Even a single
unhappy customer can cause reputational damage via social media platforms. . . ."); No Online
Customer Reviews Means BIG Problems in 2017, FAN & FUEl, https://fanandfuel.com/no-online-
customer-reviews-means-big-problems-201
7/ (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cclG74A-
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As one reputation management firm puts it: "[E]ven a single upset
individual can wreak havoc on your business-unless you catch the
problem early and do something about it."106
A second key distinction that makes nudnik-based activism
more robust is that nudniks do not engage in monetary cost-benefit
analysis. Other types of active consumers (such as comparison
shoppers) would be active only if they deem it worthwhile. Therefore,
the prevalence of "readers" in a given market is largely a function of
outside circumstances, such as the length and complexity of contracts,
or the feasibility of negotiating ex ante with sellers. When contract
length and complexity increases, as they have in the digital age, fewer
consumers will read.0 7 The nudnik's crusade, by contrast, is relatively
immune to the rising costs of activism.
The rise of the digital age therefore did not harm nudniks' ability
to effect change but, in fact, increased it. Changes in the information
environment-the rise of the internet and, in particular, social media-
made nudniks potentially more impactful by boosting their signals.10 8
Nudniks have always noticed being overcharged, but now, they can post
a negative review online about it and reach a broad audience.109
Everyone searching for that seller in the future may find the nudnik's
complaint that the seller fails to honor contractual obligations. What
may once have been an ephemeral signal is now etched forever in the
internet's memory. It is not a coincidence that big business is often
behind campaigns for a "right to be forgotten."1 10
Third, nudnik-based activism generates more spillovers. One
comparison shopper who reads through a contract does not make other
shoppers more sophisticated. By contrast, one nudnik who goes public
with her concerns can reduce the costs to other consumers of becoming
informed about a seller's competence and integrity. She allows other
LZVE] (finding in a survey that thirty-five percent of respondents might avoid a product on the
basis of a single negative review).
106. Online Reputation Management, BERNSTEIN CRISIS MGMT.,
https://www.bernsteincrisismanagement.com/portfolio-item/online-crisis-and-issues-
management/ (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cclUX5H-PKGE].
107. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 93, at 94-101.
108. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 86, at 562 ("The reviews also increase consumers' power over
the businesses they support."); Becher & Zarsky, supra note 82, at 321-33 (discussing the flow of
information between customers and potential customers).
109. At the same time, the abundance of information nowadays may sometimes limit the
visibility of any individual signal.
110. See Amy Gesenhues, The Inevitable Happened: First Company Provides 'Right to Be
Forgotten" Removal Service, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (June 25, 2014, 12:01 AM),
https://searchengineland.com/reputation-vip-online-management-firm-launches-site-assist-
googles-forget-form-194998 [https://perma.cc/4ED6-B7VS] (explaining that Google has entered the
business of helping peoples' online activity be forgotten).
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consumers to notice that they too were overcharged and may push them
to complain. By going through the takeout receipt and comparing it to
the prices on the restaurant's website, the nudnik reduces the costs of
becoming active for other consumers.
Finally, nudniks impact seller behavior not just by making sure
sellers honor their contractual obligations, but also by pushing sellers
to go beyond the contract. According to the informed minority theory, a
small subset of consumers pushes sellers to offer better contracts to
everyone. With nudniks, by contrast, a small subset of consumers
pushes sellers to perform better, regardless of sellers' contractual
obligations. Nudniks frequently assert transactional expectations: the
rights they believe they should have.'11 The marketing literature has
long recognized the importance of consumer expectations, as captured
by the influential expectancy disconfirmation theory.112 According to
this theory, consumers often operate based on their expectations from
the transaction, and these expectations are not necessarily based on the
specific contract in question. Expectations rather come from consumers'
experience with similar transactions, their general sense of fairness,
and market norms.113 Importantly for our purposes, when a "regular"
(read: passive) dissatisfied consumer finds out that there is a mismatch
between her (violated) expectations and what is owed to her according
to the contract, she often gives up the fight. Nudniks do not.
To return to our example of the NBC story on a hotel charging
for a safe in the room: the hotel explicitly stipulated that a charge would
be imposed to cover a warranty on the safe.114 The hotel was therefore
111. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 96, at 830 ('The expected cost of the term to the buyer
must be discounted by the likelihood that reputational considerations will induce the seller to treat
the buyer fairly even when such treatment is not contractually required."); Johnston, supra note
96, at 877 (explaining how consumer expectation can sometimes affect a seller's probability of
expanding the terms of a contract); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency
Problem, 2004 WIs. L. REV. 679, 722 (explaining that, when a consumer does not read a contract,
a court might determine that "[s]ome terms may be sufficiently salient or evince a sufficient
identity of interests between readers and nonreaders that market mechanisms largely internalize
the interests of nonreading buyers").
112. See Rolph E. Anderson, Consumer Dissatisfaction: The Effect of Disconfirmed Expectancy
on Perceived Product Performance, 10 J. MARKETING RES. 38, 43 (1973) (determining that, because
some might overestimate technology or innovation, "consumers may have unrealistically high
expectations for product performance even without the added boost of promotional claims"); see
also Andrew Dahl & Jimmy Peltier, A Historical Review and Future Research Agenda for the Field
of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, & Complaining Behavior, 28 J. CONSUMER
SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION & COMPLAINING BEHAV. 5, 5 (2015) (noting that the expectancy
disconfirmation theory is a "predominant theoretical approach").
113. Legal scholars have recently become aware of, and accommodated, the expectation
disconfirmation theory. See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 551 (using the phrase "term
optimism" to explain that, for several reasons, "consumers expect a contract to contain more
favorable terms than it actually provides").
114. See discussion supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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seemingly not in breach of any contractual obligation. Nevertheless, it
breached Liz's expectations. Liz felt that hotels should not behave this
way, so she shared her complaints with the media and ignited a
reputational fallout. A much more famous and consequential example
came in 2017, when United Airlines evicted a paying passenger from
the flight to accommodate another passenger.115 Even though the
airline company's contract stipulated it could deboard the passenger,
United Airlines stakeholders found the harsh treatment uncalled for
and unfair. The incident led to a swift and significant decline in
passengers' willingness to fly United.116 The entire airline industry took
notice, and the industry practices changed.117
In all these examples, what separates nudnik-based activism
from other forms of market discipline is the mechanism of change.
Nudniks create a legal and reputational risk for sellers. Sellers who
narrowly adhere to their contractual obligations may win in the
courtroom but lose in the court of public opinion. Nudnik-driven
reputational effects are sometimes enough to push firms to conform to
consumers' transactional expectations.118
Legal scholars should therefore shift from focusing on
consumers' reading behavior to focusing on consumers' complaining
behavior. Instead of an informed minority theory, we offer the theory of
the nudnik-a sort of "crusading minority." Firms that anticipate the
existence of nudniks are more likely to observe their contractual
commitments ex post and invest in quality control and customer service
ex ante. To reiterate, such bottom-up market discipline can occur even
without a critical mass of consumers reading and comprehending
115. See Erin McCann, United's Apologies: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/business/united-airlines-passenger-doctor.html [https://
perma.cclR7FM-B7GT]; Christina Zdanowicz & Emanuella Grinberg, Passenger Dragged Off
Overbooked United Flight, CNN (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/10/travel/
passenger-removed-united-flight-trndlindex.html [https://perma.cc/D2DE-NKXH] (explaining
that the passenger paid for his ticket, refused to give up his seat, and was subsequently removed
from the plane-rather forcefully).
116. See, e.g., Kevin Quealy, How Much Would You Put Up With to Avoid United Airlines?,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/upshot/how-much-would-people-
put-up-with-to-avoid-united-airlines.html [https://perma.cclH297-CW4S] (presenting survey-
based evidence that shows those with knowledge of the removal incident avoided United Airlines).
117. See Stacey Leasca, This Is How Likely It Is That You'll Get Bumped from a Flight, TRAVEL
& LEISURE (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-airports/airlines-bumping-
passengers-less [https://perma.cc/C5AY-E8KE] ("Since the incident, major airlines - not just
United - have changed their policies for overbooking.").
118. The incident led to a marked decrease in the rate of bumping passengers, from 0.62 per
10,000 to 0.44, the lowest rate in decades. Airline Bumping Rate Lowest in Decades, U.S. DEP'T
TRANSP. (Sep. 7, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot6417 [https://perma.cc/
GV8M-KVWS].
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contracts. All that is needed is (1) some consumers with nudnik-style
personality traits and (2) sellers who care about their reputations.
2. The Limits of Nudniks
As we have noted, not all nudnik activities create positive value.
Some complaints are petty and frivolous, exacting costs instead of
exposing real issues. To evaluate nudniks' overall social impact, one
should consider both the benefits and the costs of nudniks' actions. And
while we cannot offer an exact quantification of the two sides of the
equation, we offer here suggestive evidence based on a synthesis of the
marketing literature, which could inform how we design future
research or think of potential policy implications.
Perhaps the biggest potential limitation of nudnik-based
activism is that nudniks' concerns and expectations are not always
aligned with the concerns of other (less idiosyncratic) consumers. To the
extent that nudniks complain about petty, inconsequential things, it is
unlikely that their complaints will effect meaningful positive change in
seller behavior. In other words, the concern is that nudniks will force
sellers to focus too much on things that only nudniks care about. This
concern, however, seems limited in practice. The CCB literature offers
several indications that most nudniks operate in what we would call
"good faith" and that their complaints seemingly implicate broader
consumer interests. For example, if nudniks complain about things only
nudniks care about, we would expect little correlation between product
quality and complaints. In reality, however, various studies show that
consumer complaining behavior is inversely related to product
quality.119 That is, when the quality of the product is higher, consumers
complain less, and vice versa. This finding suggests that nudnik
activism is tied to actual defects in a product that are relevant to the
broader consumer body.
Another related concern is that nudniks complain for selfish
motivations, to get "freebies" and "comps," or to simply "troll" for
attention. Here as well, empirical evidence casts doubt on the scope of
the problem: serial complainers who raise an issue are more likely
(compared with passive consumers) to become repeat, loyal customers
if sellers learn from their mistakes and resolve the issue.120 This
119. See Beard et al., supra note 62, at 741 (claiming that, within the telephone industry,
"observed levels of changes in quality ... are negatively and statistically significantly related to
complaint levels"); Silke J. Forbes, The Effect of Service Quality and Expectations on Customer
Complaints, 56 J. INDUS. ECON. 190 (2008) (providing empirical data based on complaints in the
airline industry).
120. See TARP, supra note 16, at 64 (finding that "profits increase as the percentage of
satisfactorily resolved complaints increases"); Amy K. Smith & Ruth Bolton, An Experimental
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suggests a certain degree of good faith on the side of nudniks. Similarly,
another finding in the literature is that serial complainers are not only
more likely to complain against firms that behave badly, but also more
likely to compliment firms that behave well.121 We read these studies as
suggesting that, on average, nudnik-consumers are simply the more
active version of the majority of passive consumers: they notice and
confront more readily, but they notice and confront real issues.
Instead of depicting nudniks as merely trolls who are out for
revenge or "comps," the existing evidence suggests that many of them
are consumers who deeply care about how they are being treated.
But there is a broader point in play here. Our assessment of
nudniks' social impact should be detached from our judgment of
nudniks' motivations. All too often the court of public opinion tends to
focus on nudniks' "weird" motivations and portray nudniks as vengeful
and petty. Even academics and judges treat nudniks as "freeloaders,"
"fraudulent returners," and "peer-induced esteem-seekers."122 Yet the
fact that a nudnik has some selfish motivations does not mean she
cannot advance the broader good. 123 True, some nudniks may be seeking
revenge, attempting to receive material compensation, looking for
validation from others, or acting out of a sense of entitlement. Absent
such motivations, however, very few consumers would act when
dissatisfied, and sellers could continue to systematically overcharge
and underperform, assured of no negative consequences. These atypical
motivations help nudniks break out from consumers' rational apathy.
We should therefore judge nudniks' behavior based on the outputs-do
they push firms to meet other consumers' expectations?-rather than
the inputs.
Further, even when some nudniks sound false alarms, several
mechanisms tend to screen frivolous nudnik complaints and highlight
worthwhile ones. Judges screen the merits of legal complaints.
Investigative reporters follow up on tips from nudniks only if the story
Investigation of Service Failure and Recovery: Paradox or Peril?, 1 J. SERV. RES. 65, 77 (1998)
(finding that, when complaints are addressed well, "excellent service recoveries can lead to
increased customer satisfaction and repatronage intentions"); Voorhees et al., supra note 16, at
523 (illustrating that complainers with "satisfactory recovery" were substantially likely to become
repeat purchasers).
121. See Arbel, supra note 82, at 1265-67 (documenting the high share of positive reviews on
Amazon and other platforms).
122. Kate L. Reynolds & Lloyd C. Harris, When Service Failure is Not Service Failure: An
Exploration of the Forms and Motives of "llegitimate" Customer Complaining, 19 J. SERVS.
MARKETING 321, 325 (2005); see also Barnes, supra note 86, at 603-04 (calling consumers who
write emotional and nonfactual negative reviews "trolls").
123. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 9-10 (Jonathan B. Wight ed., Harriman
House 2007) (1776) ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.").
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represents a wide pattern of seller misbehavior. And fellow consumers
discount baseless negative online reviews. The fact that other
consumers are passive does not mean that they are clueless. The other
consumers can infer, based on their own experience and common sense,
whether a nudnik's complaint raises a valid problem that is indicative
of the seller's behavior. If a nudnik frivolously complains about Amazon
not shipping items fast enough, other consumers can rely on their own
good experience with Amazon and discount the claim.
To be sure, much more research on the nudnik phenomenon is
needed. Our discussion thus far has focused on the overall impact of
nudniks, and we have cited some evidence suggesting that the net effect
is likely beneficial. Ideally, we would want further research that goes
beyond the "on average" claims and delves into the cross-sectional
variation-identifying the circumstances under which nudniks are
most or least likely to generate positive contributions.12 4 Yet the
existing examples and studies already indicate that some nudniks do
contribute to meaningful market discipline, thereby positively affecting
other consumers. At a minimum, then, the existing evidence suggests
that we cannot dismiss outright the role that nudniks play in affecting
seller behavior. The gaps left by other modes of market discipline leave
ample room for these active, idiosyncratic consumers to provide an
important public service.
II. How SELLERS REACT TO NUDNIKS:
THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM
Thus far we have focused on one side of the equation-namely,
how nudniks fight underperforming sellers and hold them accountable.
But sellers do not remain passive. It is therefore time to switch focus to
how sellers fight back. More accurately, we must ask: How do sellers
reduce the legal and reputational risks posed by nudniks?
While the nudnik phenomenon has remained understudied in
the legal literature, the firms that face nudniks viscerally understand
their importance. Firms have long invested resources in attempts to
channel nudniks' complaints to less visible backchannels or mollify
124. Another promising avenue for future research comes from potential concerns about the
equality aspects of nudnik activities. One could claim, for example, that nudniks "enjoy
disproportionate power due to social or economic status." Schmitz, supra note 6, at 280. We
elaborate in Arbel & Shapira, supra note 27, at 22.
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them with preferential treatment.125 But in recent years, technological
advancements have started disrupting the balance of power between
sellers and nudniks. Sellers are increasingly enjoying access to big data
and predictive analytics tools that will allow them to effectively silence
nudniks.126 The equilibrium is changing.
We used to think of market discipline as a process whereby
buyers choose the firm they want to buy from. Yet in today's world,
sellers can increasingly choose the customers they want to sell to. Put
differently, economic analysis has traditionally assumed that only
sellers have a reputation to protect; but in today's environment, buyers
have reputations too. As this Part details, firms evaluate potential
buyers in multiple ways, including their propensities to complain and
publicly confront the underperforming seller.
Companies now store troves of data on consumer behavior at the
individual level. Using widely available consumer scores, predictive
analytics, and machine learning, sellers can make sense of all the data
and predict future consumer behavior. Critically, these algorithms can
predict certain personality traits in each consumer, including the traits
that make a consumer a nudnik.127 Section A details how sellers can use
these tools to identify nudniks before they walk into their stores. These
sellers can then either avoid selling to nudniks or silence them before
they draw public attention to seller misconduct. Section B explains why
the new technological ability to locate and silence a nudnik early, before
she even forms her claim, is a game-changer. Timing matters: the
earlier a seller can identify and silence a nudnik, the more likely it is
that the seller reduces the risk of legal and reputational sanctions, and
the less likely other consumers are to enjoy the positive spillovers from
nudnik behavior.
A. Targeting Nudniks
Nudniks pose a reputational and legal threat to sellers, and so
sellers have strong incentives to separate nudniks from non-nudniks
and then placate nudniks before they publicly air their grievances. The
question, then, is not whether sellers have the will but whether they
have the way to target nudniks. In recent years, firms have increasingly
125. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 86, at 554-55 (noting that firms attempt to include
nondisparagement clauses in consumer contracts).
126. Predictive analytics refers here to models that allow businesses to make sense of big data
and use it to their advantage. See generally Dennis Hirsch, Predictive Analytics Law and Policy: A
New Field Emerges, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOc'Y 1, 1 (2017).
127. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1434-38 (2014) (explaining that firms throughout different
industries are collecting data to better classify the behaviors and personalities of their consumers).
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gained access to new forms of big data-information on each consumer's
past interactions with one's own company as well as with other sellers-
and to predictive analytics tools: models that predict each consumer's
proclivity to act publicly when dissatisfied.128 Connecting the dots is
straightforward: we have ample reason to believe that sellers will use
the newfound technological capabilities to reduce and contain the
nudnik-based risks.
To be sure, finding smoking-gun evidence on such nudnik-
targeting practices is difficult. This is probably by design: firms do not
shout from the rooftops that they can identify and disarm nudniks, but
rather treat their use of big data as proprietary information and shield
it with trade secret protections.129 As a result, targeting practices
"remain a mystery to consumers"1 30 and are understudied by
researchers.131 In this Section, we nevertheless document various
indications that piece together a picture of sellers gradually improving
their nudnik-circumventing abilities: identifying who is a nudnik and
who is not (Section II.A.1) and then disarming them (Section II.A.2). We
should be careful not to overstate our claim; it is hard to evaluate the
scope of these practices given their secretive nature. What we can offer
are suggestive indications of emerging trends. At the same time, we
should not discount these indications: at a minimum, they suggest an
early trend and a near-future trajectory. After all, firms' usage of
consumer scores, big data, and predictive analytics to target nudniks is
only likely to increase in the coming years.132
128. Id.
129. See id. at 1435; Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic
Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the Finance
Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 117-18 (2011) (explaining that, with credit score
computations, companies can often protect their algorithmic practices through trade secret
theory); Van Loo, supra note 78, at 601 ("[Blehind a veil of trade secrecy corporations' dispute
systems exploit market failures and use unequal rules of procedure.").
130. Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating "Haves" from
"Have-Nots," 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1427; see Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the
Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 864 (2016) ("For the vast majority of lines of insurance,
there is essentially nothing limiting the amount of data that insurers can collect about individuals
and very little controlling their use of consumers' personal information.").
131. See Moshe Davidow, Organizational Responses to Customer Complaints: What Works and
What Doesn't, 5 J. SERV. RES. 225, 225 (2003) ("Unfortunately, with all of that complaining, the
implications of customer complaint behavior for organizations have been examined far less often.");
Torben Hansen et al., How Retailers Handle Complaint Management, 22 J. CONSUMER
SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION & COMPLAINING BEHAV. 1, 1 (2009) ("While many studies have
investigated the complaint process from the consumer side, those from the side of business are few
and far between.").
132. See Helveston, supra note 130, at 880 (noting that, in the insurance industry, use of





Sellers nowadays have highly specific data on each consumer's
past dealings and her personality traits, which they can turn into
predictions about future behavior. Specifically, sellers can identify each
consumer's tendency to be a nudnik. This is hardly trivial. Prior to
recent advances in information technologies, recoding each consumer's
past interactions with one's own firm was costly, and the data was not
readily available (because it was stored in hard-to-search paper
records). Nowadays, firms can easily purchase from data brokers all the
information they want about consumers' past interactions with other
sellers.133 Using this data, firms can predict whether a given consumer
is a nudnik before that consumer even sets foot in their store. Sellers
are already tracking consumers along three nudnik-relevant
dimensions: their past complaining behavior, their likelihood to
complain in the future, and the impact that their complaint is likely to
have on others.
First, customer relation management ("CRM") software allows
sellers to log information on each interaction with each customer,
including the volume and valence of past complaints:134 How many
complaints did the customer file? How detailed or negative were the
complaints? How many items did the customer return to the store? The
minute a customer contacts them, sellers therefore know all relevant
information on the customer's tendencies, including how "serial" of a
complainer she is.135 As one report puts it, firms use such data to decide
"whether a customer is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or
relegated to an overflow call center."136 It is hard to overstate how
advanced CRM tools have revolutionized the way that sellers handle
buyers; it suffices to note that it is a $30 billion industry.37
133. See discussion infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
134. See Bang Nguyen, The Dark Side of Customer Relationship Management: Exploring the
Underlying Reasons for Pitfalls, Exploitation and Unfairness, 19 J. DATABASE MARKETING &
CUSTOMER STRATEGY MGMT. 56, 58 (2012) ("[B]y adopting new technologies and the Internet, firms
have enabled CRM schemes to flourish. Using emails, social media, for example, Facebook pages,
YouTube and Twitter, and blogs, the communication directed towards potential customers can now
be customised at an individual level."); Van Loo, supra note 78, at 564 ("When a consumer reaches
out about a dispute, computer algorithms typically analyze all relevant internal and external
information available to estimate two main variables: behavior and net worth.").
135. Van Loo, supra note 78, at 564-65.
136. Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers'Buying Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-consumers-by-
potential-value.html [https://perma.cclN5UM-4U4R].
137. See Shanhong Liu, Customer Relationship Management Software Market Revenues
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Importantly, consumer data increasingly encompass more than
just the consumer's interactions with the specific seller in question.
"Data brokers" now collect and trade consumer data between sellers.138
As the FTC has reported, these brokers collect thousands of different
types of information per consumer-not just purchase history, but also
"intimate details of consumers' financial, social, and personal lives."1 39
It is a small step from here to identifying nudniks: if you know who is
likely to post glowing reviews, you also know who is likely to post
scathing ones.140
Historically, sophisticated targeting techniques were available
only to the largest retailers (because costs were prohibitive). Now, the
increased availability of (and competition among) third-party data
brokers reduces the costs of consumer targeting so that more and more
sellers are likely to use it.
Second, beyond having access to better information about each
consumer's past behavior, sellers now have access to better predictions
about each consumer's future behavior. Today, America's consumers
are being scored on a variety of metrics-well beyond the famous credit
score-by a multitude of firms that analyze data from a great variety of
sources.141 Sellers can use these scores to customize their treatment of
individual customers. "Customer churn models" accurately predict the
probability that a given customer would be dissatisfied and abandon
the business.142 Customer lifetime value ("CLV") scores predict not just
the probability that a given customer will make a purchase, but also
"the likelihood a person will . . . bad-mouth a company."143 Other
138. See generally Schmitz, supra note 130, at 1419-33 (explaining the growth in the data
broker industry and how these brokers utilize consumer data).
139. Id. at 1413; see EDITH RAMIREZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY I-Ix (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cclR6R9-GEW9].
140. See Helveston, supra note 130, at 878 (showing that the insurance industry uses big data
and predictive analytics not just in marketing, but also in claim management).
141. See PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, THE SCORING OF AMERICA: How SECRET CONSUMER
SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 6-10 (2014),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPFScoring-ofAmerica_
April20l4_fs.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK5H-4DHF].
142. See Abdelrahim Kasem Ahmad et al., Customer Churn Prediction in Telecom Using
Machine Learning in Big Data Platform, 6 J. BIG DATA 28, 34 (2019); Anupam Kundu, Machine
Learning Powered Churn Analysis for Modern Day Business Leaders, TOWARDS DATA SCl. (Oct. 24,
2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/machine-learning-powered-churn-analysis-for- modern-
day-business-leaders-ad2l77elebOd [https://perma.cc/TGB2-UGYR] (explaining churn and its
effect on business management).
143. Khadeeja Safdar, On Hold for 45 Minutes? It Might Be Your Secret Customer Score, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2018, 11:04 AM), https://www.wsj.comlarticles/on-hold-for-45-minutes-it-might-be-
your-secret-customer-score-1541084656 [https://perma.cc/NUS6-NF4L]; see also Kundu, supra
note 142 (describing how a predictive churn model can impact CLV).
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metrics predict the likelihood that a given consumer will return
items.144 The proliferation and growing sophistication of these scores
allows firms to target nudniks more accurately than ever before.
Finally, beyond assessing how likely a given consumer is to
publicly voice her frustration, sellers nowadays can also predict how
strong and far the nudnik's cry will echo. The FTC found that
companies today track each consumer's social influence scores, based
on the number of followers on social media and other metrics.145 Cross-
referencing this information with information collected from online
review platforms such as Yelp and Airbnb allows data collectors to
obtain a rich profile of each consumer and their propensity to
complain.146 Data-analysis providers then openly sell their proprietary
technology to use the data to identify who is a "fan" of a given seller or
service,147 who is likely to complain, and how influential the complaint
is going to be.148 Sellers can use these scores to assess the reputational
risk posed by each consumer. In other words, sellers can not only
identify which consumers are likely to make waves about company
failures but also predict how tall those waves will be.
144. Khadeeja Safdar, How Your Returns Are Used Against You at Best Buy, Other Retailers,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-your-returns-are-
used-against-you-at-best-buy-other-retailers-1520933400 [https://perma.cc/3PN5-NJG7].
145. See What Information Do Data Brokers Have on Consumers, and How Do They Use It?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 66-72 (2013) (statement
of Jessica Rich, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission); RAMIREZ,
supra note 139, at 31 (explaining how data brokers convert analyses into various marketing scores
for consumers).
146. See, e.g., Jure Leskovec, Web Data: Amazon Reviews, STAN. NETWORK ANALYSIS PROJECT,
https://snap.stanford.edu/data/web-Amazon.html (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
WZ56-7NFS] (compiling a dataset that tracks Amazon reviews over a period of eighteen years). It
is telling that, on more than one occasion, academic researchers managed to use such open
databases to build software that identifies negative reviews and engages with them. See, e.g., Yu-
Han Chen & John Merrick, Real Time Yelp Reviews Analysis and Response Solutions for
Restaurant Owners, DATA SCI. ACAD. BLOG (Sep. 29, 2017), https://nycdatascience.com/
blog/student-works/real-time-yelp-reviews-analysis-response-solutions-restaurant-owners/
[https://perma.cc/L6SV-FEB6] (building a bot that identifies negative reviews in Yelp and
responds to them); see also Karen Robson et al., Making Sense of Online Consumer Reviews: A
Methodology, 55 INT'L J. MKT. RES. 521 (2013) (doing the same for negative reviews in Apple's App
Store).
147. See, e.g., Sys. & Method for Managing Advertising Intelligence and Customer Relations
Management Data, U.S. Patent Application No. 20130218640 (filed Aug. 22, 2013).
148. Schmitz, supra note 130, at 1430-32. For an early account, see ED KELLER & JON BERRY,
THE INFLUENTIALS (2003) (explaining how a small group of influential Americans affect the
decisions of others). For a real-world example, see How to Find and Source the Best Influencers for
Your Brand, OBVIOUSLY, https://www.obvious.ly/en/platform-identification (last visited May 7,
2020) [https://perma.cc/2QLP-LZAB] (assisting firms in identifying social media "micro-
influencers").
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These emerging technological capabilities allow firms not just to
identify nudniks early but also to disarm them effectively, an issue that
we turn to now.
2. Disarming Nudniks
A seller who identifies a nudnik would want to minimize the
nudnik's impact as quickly as possible.149 Sellers have always employed
a wide array of disarming tactics, such as settling outside the
courthouse, delivering private apologies,150 or offering complimentary
services.151 But here as well, big data and predictive analytics are
transforming nudnik-disarming tactics. They are doing so along three
key dimensions: selective remedies, muffling, and avoiding selling to (or
gagging) nudniks to begin with.
Offering selective remedies to dissatisfied consumers is hardly a
new practice, but technological tools make the practice much more
granular and effective. In a sense, selective remedies are a form of ex
post discrimination: if two buyers were wronged, and one of them is
identified as assertive while the other is not, then sellers will go to
greater lengths to appease the former.152 New technologies allow sellers
not only to better identify whom to appease, but also how to appease
them. Predictive analytics and CRM software tell sellers whether the
dissatisfied consumer who has a propensity to fight is after money,
validation, replacement, or an apology. Sellers can then tailor the
remedy to this specific consumer, without changing their practices
toward other consumers. It is telling that firms today spend more effort
on resolving social media complaints than they do on offline complaints;
149. See Sbbastien Mena et al., On the Forgetting of Corporate Irresponsibility, 41 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 720, 725 (2016) (noting that following failures, firms engage in "forgetting" tactics,
trying to make their stakeholders discount what happened, including by silencing those who keep
reminding others of the failure).
150. See Yonathan A. Arbel & Yotam Kaplan, Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique
of Law and Apologies, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1199 (2017) (explaining how privileged apologies have
been used to limit victims' recovery and shield injurers from liability).
151. See Schmitz, supra note 6, at 280-82 (describing the industry practice of offering
complainers preferential treatment in "debt, insurance, and other business-to-consumer"
contexts). Sellers can also respond to troublesome consumers by playing hardball, as in denying
service and charging higher rates.
152. See, e.g., Becher & Zarsky, supra note 97, at 90-91; Johnston, supra note 96 (providing
an economic theory for how standard-form contracts enable cooperative negotiation). In Becher &
Zarsky's account, sellers offer selective remedies to retain the complaining customer and project a
good image toward noncomplaining customers. In other words, they focus on how sellers earn
reputation credit points, while we focus on how sellers avoid reputational sanctions.
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the former comes with greater reputational risk.153 Further, in the past,
decisions on who and how to appease were crude: if a customer was a
known celebrity or an opinion leader, that customer would get special
treatment. Nowadays, firms can offer a more effective sliding scale,
tailoring their specific treatment to the type of influence the customer
might have based on various customer scores.154
We can see evidence of such tailored preferential treatment in
the work of third-party providers who offer firms an "influencer
strategy," which means ranking consumers based on their influence on
others and prioritizing those with more influence.155 Recent
documentaries on the Fyre music festival showed how the organizers
offered ticket-buyers different housing options based on each buyer's
social media scores: "influencers" were offered villas, while "followers"
were offered huts.156
A second channel for minimizing nudniks' effects is drowning
out their voices. This, essentially, is the service that many reputation-
management firms sell: increasing the volume of irrelevant or positive
content in order to drown out negative content.15 7 By overwhelming
consumers with irrelevant information, reputation-management firms
reduce the chances that any valuable information produced by nudniks
will be seen or used. After all, for most users, page eight of Google
153. Mike Maughan, Why Angry Consumers Should Head to Instagram When It Is Time to
Make a Complaint, CNBC (Jan. 27, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/25/for-angry-
consumers-instagram-complaints-gets-the-quickest-results.html [https://perma.cc/QWJ8-7VBD].
154. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND
DIFFERENTIAL PRICING, 8-13 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
whitehousefiles/docs/BigDataReportNonembargo-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPX3-VZUQI
(noting that big data shifted price and terms differentiation from broad demographics proxies to
personal indicators).
155. The Scrunch company, for example, advises firms to:
[E]nsure that your influencer/s always receive the premium service. For example, if
you're an airline you wouldn't seat your influencers in economy or premium economy.
They should be seated up front in first class with all the bells and whistles. If their
experience is amazing, then the content they share with their community will be
amazing!
Georgia Mee, How to Give Influencers an A+ Experience and Why It's Important, SCRUNCH,
https://www.scrunch.com/blog/give-influencers-a-great-experience# (last visited May 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/84G8-L4GC].
156. E.g., FYRE: THE GREATEST PARTY THAT NEVER HAPPENED (Netflix 2019).
157. See Phil Lockwood, Turn a Negative Into Positive-Online Ratings, Reviews, and Your
Business-Plus: 10 Common Questions Answered, DISTrLL AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2017, 5:51 AM),
https://www.distillagency.com/blog/turn-negative-into-positive-online-ratings-reviews-business
[https://perma.ccMGL2-Y5FY] (encouraging clients to "[g]et more positive [online] reviews to
drown out the negative"); see also Van Loo, supra note 78, at 583 (noting firms' usage of "fake
review mills," meant to overwhelm online review sites with positive reviews).
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search results is where information goes to die.15 8 While the first
channel, selective remedies, is meant to convince nudniks not to
disseminate damning information in the first place, the second channel,
muffling of consumers' voices, is meant as damage control once the
nudnik has already publicly voiced frustration.
Lastly, and perhaps most potently, sellers can now use
personalized contracts to either limit the consumer's ability to purchase
from them or to complain after the purchase.15 9 Before the rise in
identification technologies, firms had to use blunt tools that applied to
all consumers. For example, firms could install a forced arbitration
clause in their form contracts to limit the reputational effects of public
dispute resolution.160 But adopting such provisions may, in itself, cause
a reputational backlash. A timely example comes from the legal sector,
where law students publicly battled law firms that adopted mandatory
arbitration provisions, getting the firms to reverse course.161 Another
timely example is gag clauses in form contracts, which limit every
consumer's ability to post negative reviews about the business. Yet
these provisions, too, are salient and may cause a backlash. Indeed,
after one business installed a gag clause requiring that consumers who
post negative reviews pay $2,500, Congress intervened and enacted the
Consumer Review Fairness Act,162 which invalidates such clauses.163
It is therefore much better for firms to keep their nudnik-
avoidance tactics under the radar by using them on a case-by-case basis.
One strategy would be to avoid engaging with nudniks to begin with.
To illustrate the dynamics, consider how on Airbnb, the online vacation
rentals marketplace, some hosts apparently refuse to rent their houses
to certain guests based on these guests' propensity to write negative
158. This practice goes hand in hand with firms' efforts to push right-to-be-forgotten laws,
which would allow them to remove unfavorable records entirely. See Gesenhues, supra note 110
(explaining the business model of addressing consumer removal requests).
159. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze, in full, the reasons why consumers would
not try to masquerade as nudniks. In short, we note that sellers can disarm nudniks by treating
them negatively, as in refusing service or charging a higher price.
160. See Beth Davis, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care Contracts: How
to Protect the Rights of Seniors in Washington, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213, 214 (2011) (explaining
the impact of arbitration agreements on stifling public outrage); Roy Shapira, Mandatory
Arbitration and the Market for Reputation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 873 (2019) (outlining the debate
surrounding mandatory arbitration and reputation).
161. See ROY SHAPIRA, LAW AND REPUTATION: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM SHAPES BEHAVIOR BY
PRODUCING INFORMATION (forthcoming 2020).
162. H.R. REP. NO. 114-731, at 5-6 (2016).
163. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 45b). We come back to the Act, and point out an important loophole in it, infra Part
III.
2020] 967
968 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4:929
reviews.164 A Forbes commentator summed it up nicely: "I, like many
other in-the-know hosts, tend to dig into Airbnb to see a guest's past
posted reviews. If I see nothing but bitterness and complaining, they're
a hard pass."1 6 5 Given that the overwhelming majority of Airbnb guests
refrain from writing a detailed negative review (even when one is
merited),166 the ability of hosts to avoid the few that do post reviews
decreases the informativeness of reviews. Similar dynamics have been
in play in offline contexts, such as doctors avoiding litigious patients167
or landlords avoiding litigious tenants.168
B. The Implications of Targeting Nudniks
There is nothing new about sellers exerting effort to silence
buyers who could publicly challenge them. Think, for example, about
the prevalence of confidential settlements, which some view as
defendant firms bribing plaintiffs to not warn others. Why does it
matter, then, that sellers have recently gotten better at targeting
nudniks? If sellers would have eventually paid nudniks off even without
big data tools, why does it matter that they can now identify and pay
them off much earlier? This Section shows that timing matters. The
earlier sellers can identify and disarm nudniks, the fewer positive
spillovers nudniks generate. Earlier interventions limit not only the
effectiveness of legal deterrence but also the effectiveness of
reputational deterrence.
164. AirReview, CHROME WEB STORE, https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detaillairreview/
plkdnpjpnhhnmigmekaocdfokkmebdnm?hl=en-US (last visited May 7, 2020) [https:/perma.cc/
ZU4J-54UZ]; see, e.g., Annet3176, Airreview - a Little Helpful Extension to Screen Guests,
AIRHOSTS F., https://airhostsforum.comltlairreview-a-little-helpful-extension-to-screen-guests/
30341 (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X3JN-69YQ] ("I use it and find it helpful.").
165. Seth Porges, All Airbnb Hosts Should Use This Chrome Extension for Screening Guests,
FORBES (July 27, 2017, 12:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/2017/07/27/all-airbnb-
hosts-should-use-this-chrome-extension-for-screening-guests/#4c4c9a5d408 1 [https://perma.cc/
FA9V-PKLB]; see also u/lamWoe, Best Hosts, What Would You Love to See in a Message?, REDDIT
(Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.reddit.com/r/AirBnB/comments/b7e37ilbest-hosts-what-wouldyou
love to see in amessageejr6pll/ [https://perma.cc/8V2E-TKPY] (discussing how owners use
AirReview to screen potential tenants).
166. See Georgios Zervas et al., A First Look at Online Reputation on Airbnb, Where Every
Stay is Above Average (Apr. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2554500 [https://perma.cc/F7SS-VTJ4] (finding that the majority of
reviews are positive, even for properties that are of lower quality, as judged by their reviews on
another platform).
167. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Database for Doctors Tracks Litigious Patients, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 5, 2004, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB107844497811447118 [https://
perma.cc/B9M7-KQN8]. This particular database has since been shut down.
168. See Esme Caramello & Nora Mahlberg, Combating Tenant Blacklisting Based on Housing
Court Records: A Survey of Approaches, 2017 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (detailing the practice of
tenant-screening bureaus, which collect housing court data and sell them to landlords).
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1. Diluting Legal Deterrence
By using technology to identify and disarm nudniks early,
sellers can significantly dilute legal deterrence.
To see why, let us first consider the benchmark: namely, legal
deterrence before big data. Firms have always had incentives to pay
handsomely to settle a nudnik's claim in exchange for the nudnik's
commitment to confidentiality. Indeed, most cases settle secretly, with
the parties stipulating to keep the details of their dispute private.169
Legal scholars were quick to note the divergence of private and public
interests here: both parties have incentives to handle their disputes in
ways that limit public access to information.170 Defendants are willing
to pay more for a confidentiality provision to save themselves the risk
of adverse publicity and exposure to subsequent class actions.
Consumer plaintiffs anticipate defendants' willingness to pay for
secrecy and use it as a bargaining chip. A plaintiff who receives a
generous offer may be inclined to accept it because she does not factor
in the loss of positive spillovers. That is, at this point she may not care
whether relevant information becomes available to third parties.171
Yet, in a world without big data, confidential settlements could
still generate deterrence.172 One reason is that the plaintiff who
complains first, and exposes a certain defect, may be able to extract a
hefty settlement amount from the defendant company. Say a nudnik-
plaintiff has exposed a practice of overcharging takeaway purchases by
$4 each. The plaintiff anticipates that the overcharge has been
occurring over one month and that each day the restaurant services one
hundred takeaway orders. The plaintiff therefore anticipates that the
defendant restaurant had been overcharging other customers to the
tune of $12,000 collectively. The other customers are currently not
aware that they were overcharged, and the restaurant would like to
keep it that way. If the nudnik drives a hard bargain, she should be able
to reach a large settlement, well beyond the harm of $4 and up to
169. See Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers'
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 491 nn.16-19 (2008) (compiling references); Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping
Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 946 n.1 (2010) (same).
170. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 605 (1997) (describing settlement as a
means of securing privacy and maintaining secrecy at the expense of social goals); Wendy Wagner,
When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 709-
10 nn.71-74 (2007) (compiling references that address privacy through settlement).
171. See Shapira, Law as Source, supra note 73, at 204 (outlining the conflicting interests
when looking at settlement as a remedy).
172. See generally Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil,
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311 (2018) (exploring how, under
certain conditions, even confidential (or semi-confidential) settlements can generate deterrence).
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$12,000. That settlement, in itself, approaches a sanction that is
sufficiently large to deter overcharging. As a result, even though the
other customers were not informed, such settlements save them from
additional overcharging in the future.173
The ability of plaintiffs to extract rents depends, however, on
when they settle. Deterrence through confidential settlements happens
only when the nudnik-plaintiff can assess defendants' exposure to
liability for other plaintiffs (and thus know how hard a bargain to
drive). When firms target nudniks early, they reduce the likelihood that
the first plaintiff accurately perceives the number of other victims or
the extent of harms done to them.174 The seller can avoid selling to the
nudnik altogether. The seller can sell to the nudnik but offer
preferential treatment ex ante, so that the nudnik is not dissatisfied
with her purchase. If a nudnik is dissatisfied, the seller can offer a
quick, full refund and better treatment ex post, before the nudnik
escalates her complaint into a lawsuit. And even if a nudnik files a
lawsuit, the seller can settle early, before the lawsuit reaches the
discovery stage. Although the nudnik does not need discovery to tell her
she was wronged, she often needs discovery to tell her how many others
were wronged and whether the misbehavior in question was an isolated
mistake or an ongoing practice. Further, because sellers often keep
early targeting practices secret,175 the nudnik does not know why or
when in the process she was targeted and does not know whether she
is the lone complainer or just the first. As a result, the nudnik is less
likely to extract rents from sellers and produce deterrence.176
There is a broader point here. Legal scholars and policymakers
are constantly engaged in the policy debate of private versus public
resolution of disputes: settlement versus trial, confidentiality versus
openness, mandatory arbitration versus litigation, and so on.177 But all
these debates may become moot if potential defendants can silence
potential plaintiffs early. To use the classic naming-blaming-claiming
typology,1 78 the extant literature focuses on what happens after
grievances evolve into lawsuits in the post-claiming stages. In contrast,
we highlight the ability of companies to interject earlier, before the
173. Id.
174. Id. at 353.
175. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 127, at 1434-38 (noting the secrecy around big data
practices).
176. It also helps that the seller is able to tell the complaining buyer: "You are the only one
who has experienced problems with the product! You must have done something wrong."
177. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 169, at 493-94 nn.27-31 (compiling references); Jack H.
Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POLY 67, 67-68
n.1 (2000) (same).
178. See Felstiner et al., supra note 11.
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aggrieved party files a lawsuit, in the pre-claiming-and sometimes
even pre-blaming-stages. Scholars have warned that when claims are
funneled into private and confidential channels of resolution, we lose
some of the deterrent effect1 79 as well as the development of a vibrant
body of law to guide future behavior.80 The same logic applies when the
injured parties have not even formed their claims to begin with. In fact,
the logic applies more forcefully, if only because settling before claiming
reduces not just legal deterrence but also reputational deterrence.
2. Diluting Reputational Deterrence
One way to build a good reputation is by investing in offering
higher quality products and better customer service. Another
(nonexclusive) way is to invest in appearance management.181 When
technological changes make investing in appearances more effective,
they crowd out incentives to invest in the actual product and service.
Drowning out bad reviews has roughly the same effect as not having
bad reviews written about you at all.1 82
The ability to silence nudniks early in the process significantly
reduces a firm's exposure to reputational risk through two key conduits:
online reviews and litigation.
Consider online reviews first. Only a small subset of consumers
bother to write detailed reviews that spotlight the negative aspects of a
product or service.183 If-as in the Airbnb example-sellers can avoid
selling to these detailed-review-writing buyers (or sell them a better
product or service), then seller failures become invisible to the market.
Next, consider the much less intuitive channel of litigation. If
sellers can target nudniks early and settle any claims these nudniks
might have before they file lawsuits, sellers will significantly reduce not
just legal risk but also reputational risk. This is because litigation and
179. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. REV.
2619, 2649-50 (1995) (outlining this particular problem through a discussion of product liability
claims); Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don't Know Can Kill You!, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 237.
180. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 117-18 (2008) (exploring deterrence-based critiques to arbitration);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware's Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE'S DOMINANCE IN CORPORATE LAW 35, 51 (Stephen M.
Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018) (articulating the state of arbitration bylaws in Delaware law).
181. See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (describing how reputational considerations
can ensure contractual performance).
182. Note that competitive pressures would not necessarily push firms toward investing in
actual quality and away from appearance management. In fact, the opposite is more likely to
happen. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS (2015).
183. See Woolf, supra note 86.
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reputation are interconnected. What happens in the courtroom trickles
out and affects the court of public opinion.184
A short primer on reputation through litigation is in order.
Litigation affects sellers' behavior not just directly, by forcing them to
compensate aggrieved customers, but also indirectly, by producing
information on how the sellers behaved.185 To the extent that
information produced during litigation becomes public, it affects the
way that outside observers treat the defendant seller. Litigation affects
the seller's reputation through various channels: revelation, diffusion,
certification, and attribution of information.186 A firm's ability to target
potential plaintiffs early, before they even become plaintiffs, distorts
the operation of all those channels.187
Take revelation, for example. Litigation can affect reputations
by extracting damning information about the sellers that market
players were not privy to.188 The classic example here is internal email
communications exposed during discovery that show the seller
knowingly skirted safety concerns and later engaged in a cover-up. Yet
if a firm manages to settle the nudnik's claim earlier, chances are it will
escape discovery and will not be forced to disclose electronic
communications.
Another common effect of litigation concerns the diffusion of
damning information. For reputational sanctions to be meaningful, the
revealed information has to be widely diffused, so as to reach a critical
mass of stakeholders that will take their business elsewhere.189 This is
usually achieved via media coverage. In a separate project, one of us
showed that litigation shapes the frequency and tenor of media
coverage.190 For example, content analysis of the Pulitzer Prize-
winning investigative projects over the past twenty years reveals that
over half relied heavily on "legal sources" such as regulatory
investigation reports and court documents.191
184. See Shapira, supra note 160, at 887-89 (describing four ways in which litigation affects
reputation).
185. See Shapira, Reputation through Litigation, supra note 73; Roy Shapira, A Reputational
Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7 (2015).
186. See Shapira, supra note 160, at 885-88.
187. Id. We elaborate here only on two channels (revelation and diffusion) for considerations
of brevity and scope. For the other two channels (attribution and certification), see id.
188. Shapira, supra note 185, at 13.
189. Shapira, supra note 160, at 886.
190. See Shapira, Law as Source, supra note 73, at 173-76.
191. Id. at 186-92. There exist multiple reasons for investigative reporters' reliance on legal
sources. Litigation feeds journalists so-called "information subsidies": court documents reduce the
costs to journalists of covering a story about product defects or bad customer service. Id. at 166-
67. They provide information that is well-documented and detailed, contains good quotes from
internal company documents, and is libel-proof. Id. at 173-75.
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Thus, if sellers are able to disarm nudniks before they form their
claims and file them in court (or complain to a regulator), they greatly
reduce the risk of media scrutiny. Interviews with reporters reveal a
common practice of what they call "pattern-identifying": searching legal
databases to discover how many claims were filed with respect to the
issue they are investigating.19 2 Identifying such patterns has spurred
many investigative reports; yet in a world where no paper trail is
created-because no claim was filed-the ability of reporters to locate
and uncover stories of seller misconduct is significantly hampered. Put
differently, litigation is an important source of media stories on seller
misconduct. Without litigation, the ability of the media to hold sellers
accountable falters.
In recent years, legal scholars have started exploring the
negative aspects of big data tools that are used to segment buyers. Yet
the existing accounts focus on privacy, fairness, equality, and due
process in the context of effects on specific customers.193 This Part has
shifted the focus from how personalization affects justice and efficiency
toward targeted consumers to how personalization affects market forces
overall.
To illustrate some of the implications of nudnik-circumventing
technologies, we can simply recast the informed minority model.
Schwartz and Wilde explicitly stipulated that their model of market
discipline rests on the assumption that firms cannot distinguish
between searching and nonsearching consumers (what is known as a
"pooling" equilibrium).194 But while pooling may have been a realistic
equilibrium forty years ago when Schwartz and Wilde penned their
model, nowadays, when each consumer carries her own reputation
score, sellers can and increasingly do treat consumers differently. As a
result, the rest of us passive consumers, who do not search in advance
192. Id. at 210.
193. See Schmitz, supra note 130, at 1415-18 (suggesting that big data tools allow firms to
discriminate in ways that perpetuate stereotypes and aggravate the rift between haves and have-
nots); Van Loo, supra note 78, at 577 (warning about unfair process and inequalities in firms'
internal dispute resolution practices); see, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due
Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96-109
(2014) (voicing privacy concerns over predictive analytics).
194. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 9, at 663 (noting that if firms would be able to separate
searchers and nonsearchers, they would "exploit nonsearchers by charging them higher prices or




or enforce after the fact, are worse off. Is there a way to stop this
development?
III. How TO STOP THE FUTURE
Part I highlighted the important role that a small minority of
crusading consumers can play in holding sellers accountable. Yet Part
II provided reasons for pessimism: technological advancements in the
collection and analysis of consumer behavior data could eventually
allow sellers to curtail the role that nudniks play. Even if one
recognizes, as we do, that nudnik behavior is not always socially
beneficial, one should still be concerned with the prospect of sellers
avoiding or silencing nudniks wholesale. Sellers have incentives to
block not just the "bad" nudniks but also-indeed even more so--the
"good" ones, those who bring real issues with seller behavior to light. In
other words, there is reason to worry about the future of consumer
activism.195 It is time to turn our attention to whether it is possible to
forestall the nudniks' extinction.
Section A explains why some intervention is needed, despite
what other accounts of market discipline advocate. While previous
accounts view reputation as a justification to scale back legal
intervention, we focus on how legal intervention is needed to facilitate
a well-functioning market for reputation.196 Section B argues that
existing proposals to regulate big data tools are ill-equipped to deal with
the unique problems that nudnik targeting generates. Section C
sketches potential legislative, regulatory, and judicial solutions. The
solutions fall into one of two categories: (1) buck the trend of nudnik
targeting to preserve nudnik-based market discipline; or (2) ramp up
legal channels of consumer protection to compensate for sellers'
takeover of this channel of market discipline. Section D clarifies that,
across all these solutions, our aim is not to maximize nudnik activity
but rather to optimize it. Not all nudnik-based activism generates social
benefits. Accordingly, our aim should be to facilitate value-creating
nudnik actions while minimizing value-destroying nudnik actions. -
195. The only reason not to worry about the trend of sellers gaining proficiency in identifying
and disarming nudniks is if you believe that the market currently systematically overdeters
sellers. If this is the case, letting sellers curtail market discipline would merely bring us back to
normal.
196. See Arbel, supra note 82, at 1287-1303 (offering reputation-by-regulation as a systematic
way to use legal institutions to foster the creation and creation of reputational information);
Shapira, Law as Source, supra note 73, at 200; Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation, supra note
73, at 1238.
974 [Vol. 73:4:929
THEORY OF THE NUDNIK
A. Why Legal Intervention Is Needed
Legal scholars have long recognized that reputation matters in
consumer markets. Yet existing accounts usually invoke reputation as
a justification for scaling back legal intervention. A classic example is
the Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner model, which states that
sellers mindful of their reputations will treat buyers fairly, often going
beyond what is legally required.197 Many scholars have suggested that
the argument applies even more forcefully to the sharing economy, in
which reputational information is readily available, and, therefore, top-
down regulation is often superfluous.198 Under these assumptions, the
need for legal intervention is minimal, as reputational concerns
supposedly carry the burden of deterrence on their own.
In contrast, we argue that legal intervention is needed to protect
the market for reputation. The creation of reputational information
hinges on buyers noticing seller misconduct and diffusing that
information to other buyers. If sellers can intercept the production of
reputational information, they will be able to evade reputational
discipline.
One basic difference in the underlying assumptions drives these
stark differences between our model's legal implications and existing
models' legal implications. In existing accounts, only sellers have a
reputation to protect; in our account, buyers have reputations too.
Existing accounts did not-and could not, given the time when they
were written-factor in the technological developments that allow
sellers to track buyers' behavior and assign a score to each of us. Yet in
today's world, sellers can readily purchase information telling them
which consumer is likely to go on a crusade, share embarrassing
information, and complain to the regulator.
The ability to assign a reputation score to each consumer
changes the equilibrium. In the old models, buyers are the ones deciding
from whom to purchase; in our model, sellers decide to whom they want
to sell. As a result, sellers that care about their reputation do not have
197. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 96, at 831-33.
198. See, e.g., ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND
THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 138 (2016) ("Eventually, peer-to-peer platforms may
provide a basis upon which society can develop more rational, ethical, and participatory models of
regulation."); Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts:
How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 300
(2016) (describing how service providers can better assess customers when reputational evidence
is readily available); Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and
Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the "Lemons Problem," 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 830 (2015).
For the economists' perspective, see, for example, Alex Tabarrok & Tyler Cowen, The End of




to invest as much in treating all consumers nicely; they can instead
invest in treating a small subset of consumers nicely (or, worse, avoiding
them altogether). The upshot is straightforward: recognizing the
importance of reputation does not justify scaling back legal intervention
across the board. In fact, it may justify adding new forms of legal
intervention.199
B. Why Existing Modes of Intervention Are Less Likely to Work
Legal scholars and policymakers have recently started turning
their attention to big data and predictive algorithms, proposing
solutions for potential dangers. Yet neither the proposed changes nor
the existing legal tools are well equipped to deal with the specific
nudnik-targeting problem we highlight here. This is because existing
accounts focus on the dangers of opaque, unequal, and unfair treatment
of the targeted consumers.200 We, by contrast, highlight the
fundamentally different problem of third-party effects on nontargeted
consumers.
A recent White House report exemplifies the conventional
worries: big data and predictive analytics, the report notes, "may
facilitate discrimination against protected groups," thus taking
"advantage of unwary consumers."201 Accordingly, the report proposes
(1) using existing antidiscrimination laws to tackle the unfair
treatment of historically disadvantaged groups, and (2) increasing
transparency to inform consumers of how sellers are treating them
differently.202
But nudniks are not a protected class. The existing
antidiscrimination laws ban discrimination based on factors such as
race, gender, or sexual orientation.203 These laws do not ban
discrimination based on proclivity to complain. Relying on existing
antidiscrimination laws will -therefore not solve the nudnik-targeting
199. See Arbel, supra note 82, at 1287-1303 (advocating "Reputation-by-Regulation"-the use
of law to preserve and harness the power of reputation); Shapira, Law as Source, supra note 73,
at 200-01 (arguing for a more cautious approach to scaling back legal intervention). To be clear,
not all of our proposals involve greater regulatory interventions. We focus on the type of
intervention (pro- or anti-reputation creation) rather than the size of intervention (more or less
regulation).
200. See, e.g., CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 8 (2016) (on the inequality problem); FRANK PASQUALE,
THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 9
(2015) (on the opacity problem). But see Arbel, supra note 71, at 174 (noting that opaqueness can
be a virtue as it allows agencies to design gaming-proof interventions).
201. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 154, at 16.
202. Id.
203. Helveston, supra note 130, at 875.
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problem. Nor are nudniks "unwary consumers." More sunlight will not
necessarily disinfect nudnik-targeting practices because the problem is
not one of information. The assumption behind disclosure solutions is
that the target audience would resist the disclosed practice once they
become aware of it. But if sellers disarm nudniks by offering them better
treatment, nudniks have no reason to flag such behavior. Disclosure
would not work either.
Addressing the nudnik-targeting problem will therefore require
some creative thinking on the part of legislators, regulators, and
judges.204 The next Section proposes some initial counterintuitive
strategies.
C. Proposed Solutions
Banning outright the use of big data and predictive analytics is
infeasible and makes little sense, as these tools can offer benefits not
just to sellers but also to consumers.205 The goal is to find a way to limit
the use of nudnik-targeting technologies that limit the production and
propagation of useful information. Section III.C.1 highlights the legal
tools that regulators can employ, while Section III.C.2 focuses on how
judges can reinterpret longstanding doctrines to mitigate the effects of
nudnik targeting. The choice between the different methods we offer
should depend on one's assessment of the severity of nudnik targeting
at a given point in time and in a given market. After all, the nudnik-
targeting trend is in its early stages, so we are aiming at a moving
target. This is where Section III.C.3 comes in, which is directed at
scholars and sketches ways in which the nudnik perspective can inform
future research.
1. Lessons for Regulators
On paper, regulators already have the tools to deal with the
dangers of nudnik targeting. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act prohibits unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices
("UDAP"). The section and its equivalents at the state level grant wide
authority to numerous regulators (trade commissioners, consumer
protection agencies, and so on) to pursue big data practices that they
204. See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 97, at 75 ("[C]ounter-intuitively, policy makers should
add firms' lenient conduct to the growing list of firms' suspicious behaviors.").
205. See Helveston, supra note 130, at 864-65.
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perceive as harming consumers.206 Yet applying the UDAP standard to
nudnik-targeting practices is far from straightforward.2 0 7
To find nudnik-targeting practices unfair, regulators will have
to show that the targeting is "likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers," which cannot be avoided or is not offset by other benefits.208
Yet sellers could readily find commercial justifications for their
targeting practices. If sellers charge nudniks a higher price, they can
rationalize it based on the nudnik's propensity to consume more
customer service resources. If sellers offer nudniks preferential
treatment, they can present it as catering to the nudnik's special
needs.209 And when sellers avoid nudniks to begin with, their practices
may be too opaque for someone on the outside to notice.
It is perhaps better to think of nudnik targeting as "deceptive"
toward other consumers: when sellers target buyers who are likely to
notice and share damning information about them, they maintain a
factually inaccurate brand image by silencing justified criticisms.210 To
reiterate, the problem here is not between the contractual parties, but
rather with third parties: the broad societal interest in having a well-
functioning market for seller reputation. Recognizing nudnik targeting
as "deceptive" would therefore require creative interpretation.
Fortunately, Congress has recently provided a blueprint for the
proper balance between protecting the information flow and preserving
freedom of contract: the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016
("CRFA"). 211 The CRFA voids provisions in form contracts that restrict
206. See Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private
Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 914 (2017)
(reviewing equivalents at the state level).
207. Compare Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders' Use of
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 43-47 (2018) (discussing difficulties with regulating big data
under the 'unfairness' standard), with Dennis D. Hirsch, That's Unfair! Or Is it? Big Data,
Discrimination and the FTC's Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 347-48 (2014) (calling for
the regulation of big data on the basis of UDAP legislation).
208. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)(a) (2012); see also NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.3.2.2 (9th ed. 2016) ("[An act or practice must cause or be
'likely to cause' substantial injury to consumers.").
209. The nudniks themselves may believe that they deserve the preferential treatment for
being more active than other consumers.
210. Note, for example, how the law deals carefully with advertising that rests on consumer
endorsements. 16 C.F.R. § 255.2 (2019).
211. Consumer Review Fairness Act of2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 45b). As of now, three states have enacted similar laws: CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8
(West 2020); 815 ILL. COMIP. STAT. 505/2UUU (2019); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1325
(LexisNexis 2020). A similar bill is also pending: New York A5718, TRACKBILL,
https://trackbill.com/bill/new-york-assembly-bill-5718-prohibits-the-use-of-non-disparagement-
clauses-in-consumer-contracts/1391172/ (last visited May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K3AE-MPT8].
On CRFA and its limitations, see generally Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review
Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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the consumer's ability to review the seller's services.212 Congress
declared the use of such provisions an unfair and deceptive act,213 and
the FTC recently showed a willingness to enforce the CRFA
vigorously.214
The stated rationale behind the CRFA is protecting information
flow. 2 1 5 Congress noted: "The consequences of these non-disparagement
clauses are far ranging. . . . [They] distort public reviews of a
business ... thus harming consumers who rely on such reviews."216 The
same rationale, we argue, should apply to nudnik-targeting practices.
When a seller avoids interacting with a consumer based on the
consumer's propensity to complain, or when a seller "bribes" consumers
who are more inclined to post negative reviews before they do so (or
shortly after, in an attempt to have the review removed), the seller is
clearly distorting information flow. From our vantage point, the CRFA
reflects Congress's view on the proper balance between freedom of
contract and the market for reputation, and regulators at the state and
federal levels should view the act as a rallying call to start more strictly
regulating practices that impede the information flow.
There is a counterintuitive point at play when discussing the
effectiveness of CRFA-like interventions. The CRFA as currently
construed contains a loophole. It prohibits gag orders only in form
contracts.217 This reflects the traditional thinking that consumers fare
worse in standard form contracts and better in personal contracts.218
Yet, as we noted in this Article, the personal, algorithmic tailoring of
contracts can actually make things worse for consumers as a group. If a
212. § 2, 130 Stat. at 1355 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1)).
213. § 2, 130 Stat. at 1357 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45b(d)(1)).
214. In 2018, for instance, the FTC acted against a seller that sold workshops and asked
buyers to sign an agreement limiting their ability to post negative reviews on the workshop.
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Sellers Playbook, Inc.,
No. 0:18-cv-02207-DWF-TNL (D. Minn. July 7, 2018) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cases/sellers-playbookscomplaint.pdf [https://perma.cclW572-3P2P]. The case was later settled,
with the company required to pay $20.8 million and suspend the sales of business coaching. Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Defendants in Sellers Playbook Get-Rich Scheme Settle with FTC
and Minnesota (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/12/defendants-
sellers-playbook-get-rich-scheme-settle-ftc-minnesota [https://perma.cc/338Z-Z3VW].
215. H.R. REP. No. 114-731, at 5 (2016); see also Eric Goldman, An Assessment of the Consumer
Review Freedom Act of 2015 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2-15, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686021 [https://perma.cc/6X88-DQFG]
(discussing the reason for and likely impact of the Consumer Review Freedom Act).
216. S. REP. No. 114-175, at 2 (2015).
217. Section (a)(3)(A) to the Act defines "form contract" as "a contract with standardized
terms." § 2, 130 Stat. at 1355 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45b(a)(3)(A)). The legislation in the
three states that adopted similar legislation does not contain this restriction. See laws cited supra
note 211; see also Goldman, supra note 211, at 10-15 (discussing the gaps left in the CRFA).
218. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71
(1960) (discussing the lack of any real specific assent to boiler-plate form contracts).
2020] 979
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
seller personalizes its contracts to include gag clauses only when selling
to nudniks, such personalization may meet the letter of the law, but
doing so will manipulate the integrity of information flow and thus
violate the spirit of CRFA.
Beyond assuring that sellers do not block consumers from
sharing information, regulators can also generate information that
would contribute to the development of seller reputation, which will
allow the market discipline itself.219 The CFPB may have provided a
blueprint for such regulation through reputation when it assembled a
database that provides relatively fine-grained data, including
individual complaints about banks and the consumer's narrative about
their negative experiences with the bank.220 Another step that
regulators could take is to investigate consumer complaints more
frequently and seriously.221 If sellers can block the most persistent
complainers, regulators should compensate by making it easier for less
persistent complainers to be heard.
Regulators could also opt to enhance the legal channels of
consumer activism to compensate for sellers' growing ability to distort
the reputational channels. For example, several state laws employ
consumers as private attorneys general, allowing them to bring action
against sellers' violations222 or awarding treble damages and attorney
fees to successful plaintiffs.223
219. Some private initiatives, such as consumer reports, also create and disseminate
reputational information. But they are subject to potential conflicts of interest with advertisers
and reviewed firms. See David Adam Friedman, Do We Need Help Using Yelp? Regulating
Advertising on Mediated Reputation Systems, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 97 (2017); Van Loo, supra
note 78, at 583-84 (describing the shortcomings of privately run websites for consumer reporting).
220. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/ (la tvisited May 7, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/QN29-A87D]. For criticism of this database, see Patrick Lunsford, Allegations
Ain't Facts: CFPB Unleashes Credit Card Complaint Database, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2012, 11:51 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insidearm/2012/06/19/allegations-aint-facts-cfpb-unleashes-credit-
card-complaint-database/#2436143d461d [https://perma.ccl7SW3-UJZH]. Other examples come
from the FTC, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-
2019/consumer sentinel network data book_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/89N2-AQT3], and the
Department of Transportation, Air Travel Consumer Reports for 2019, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (2019),
https://cms8.dot.gov/airconsumer/air-travel-consumer-reports-2019 [https://perma.cclV658-4479].
221. See Van Loo, supra note 78, at 597-98 (proposing two different ways for regulators to
improve their investigations-integrating data from various reporting sources to create more
comprehensive software and improving methods for investigating complaints submitted to them
directly).
222. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 445.911(2) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.12 (West 2020);
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.150 (2019); Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011).
223. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 23-27 (2005) (outlining the different approaches tates have
taken for awarding treble damages or attorney fees).
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2. Lessons for Courts
Judges aware of the dangers of nudnik targeting can reinterpret
statutes and doctrines in ways that forestall nudniks' extinction. Our
discussion of how regulators' might interpret FTCA or CRFA applies to
judges as well. Judges can also strike out gag clauses and other limits
on sharing reviews through open-ended doctrines such as
unconscionability and public policy. 2 2 4 Indeed, Eric Goldman has
claimed that the CRFA merely mirrors an organic development that
was already underway in state courts, which were using existing
doctrinal tools to protect information flows. 22 5
Armed with a better understanding of serial complainers and
their role in the market, courts can also reevaluate longstanding
doctrines such as standing and de minimis. To understand how the
theory of the nudnik relates to standing, think about the 2016 Supreme
Court case of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.226 There, Robins discovered that an
online database described him as employed, wealthy, and married,
whereas he was actually unemployed, not well-off, and single.227 Robins
sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), on the ground that
the website presented a consumer report without following "reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy."228 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, noting that the "bare" procedural violation was not concrete
enough to provide Robins with standing.229 Other courts quickly
followed the Spokeo ruling, rejecting numerous consumer actions in the
process.230
The analysis presented in this Article suggests that the broad
application of the Spokeo standard to nudniks may be problematic, if
only for these two reasons.231 First, for nudniks, being falsely presented
224. Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer "Gag"
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 WM. & MARY BUs. L. REV. 59, 101-
40 (2016).
225. Goldman, supra note 211, at 8-9.
226. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
227. Id. at 1546.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545-46.
229. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Spokeo applies to federal courts, while many consumer law
disputes arise in state courts. Still, we use it here to illustrate the dynamics in place when courts
evaluate nudnik-type litigation.
230. See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193, 197 (D.D.C. 2016), rev'd, 865 F.3d 620
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (denying a privacy claim for lack of particular harm in a breach of an insurance
company's database which exposed the records of over one million consumers).
231. Beyond the two specific reasons provided above the line, we note a general flaw in the
Spokeo reasoning: to the extent that the treatment a consumer receives depends on the data
available about this consumer online, wrong information on the consumer (even if supposedly
2020] 981
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
as affluent, or being overcharged by $4, is a concrete injury. In that
sense, nudniks are eggshell consumers.232 Second, applying Spokeo
broadly also blocks an important channel (litigation) through which
nudniks effectively warn other consumers about seller misbehavior. By
going through the trouble of litigating a $4 overcharge or a false
representation as wealthy, nudniks generate positive externalities:
creating a public record of past misconduct and deterring future
misconduct (the reputation-through-litigation argument).
One could counter by arguing that denying standing for the
"petty claims" of nudniks is necessary to clear the docket for more
meaningful, meritorious claims by others. Yet such reasoning
misjudges how consumer dynamics work. Most of us would not go
through the trouble of comparing prices on the delivery receipt to those
on the website and therefore would not even notice the overcharge.
Without nudniks voicing their concerns publicly, other consumers
would not reach the blaming stage (i.e., they would not notice something
amiss with the seller), or they would not reach the claiming stage (i.e.,
they would notice but not pursue it).
We do not call for a radical departure from standing doctrine.
Our proposal is more modest: when assessing the question of standing,
courts should be aware of the nudnik's special psychological makeup
and the potential for broad market improvements that their seemingly
petty claims can generate.233 These underappreciated benefits are
relevant especially in cases in which the plaintiff fights a seller's
practice that affects many other (silent) consumers.
Similar reasoning applies to judicial interpretation of the de
minimis doctrine. Again, it is best illustrated by a concrete case of a
nudnik in action: Troester v. Starbucks.234 There, a barista sued
favorable) may distort the quality of treatment she receives in opaque ways. Robins v. Spokeo,
Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017).
232. The facts in Spokeo vividly illustrate the point: for many of us, being described as affluent
and married is not particularly harmful. Id. Yet to the specific nudnik in question, these wrongful
misstatements may have actually been harmful.
233. Some courts have already found creative ways to avoid the Spokeo ruling. In one case, a
consumer complained about robo-calling, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
which regulates unwanted calls to consumers. Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 643
(N.D.W. Va. 2016); see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (2012). The court found that the consumer did
suffer a concrete injury, because-beyond any harm to privacy-the calls intruded on his phone
"capacity," draining it of electricity and consuming its prepaid minutes. Mey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at
644-46.
234. Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 421 P.3d 1114 (2018). Note that this case involves activism
in the employment contract context, rather than the consumer context. For similar examples from
the consumer context, see, for example, Skaff v. Meridien North America Beverly Hills, LLC, 506
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2007), ruling that a misleading promise of a usable shower for disabled person
staying in a hotel was de minimis, and Harris v. Time, Inc., 237 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987),
ruling that a misleading promise of a free watch in return for opening an envelope was de minimis.
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Starbucks under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to
count the roughly four minutes it took him to clock out and finish
locking up the store.235 The district court rejected the lawsuit, reasoning
that four minutes is a trifling matter that fails to pass the de minimis
threshold.236
Here as well, recognizing the social benefits of nudnik activism
highlights two problems: (1) for nudniks, being systematically
underpaid by four minutes is hardly a trifling matter (the "eggshell"
point); (2) more importantly, the issue is not the harm done to this
particular employee (the nudnik), but the much more consequential
harm done to all other (passive) employees. A simple, back-of-the-
envelope calculation helps demonstrate this harm: Starbucks employs
roughly 209,000 employees in the United States.237 Say that only one in
ten closes the store. This translates to four minutes per night for 20,900
employees, or 508,566 hours annually. Even if all these employees earn
minimum wage ($7.25 hourly), the overall amount implicated in four-
minute overcharging would be, conservatively, $3,687,108 annually. In
that sense, a nudnik plaintiff operates similarly to a class action, that
is, it draws attention to the harm done to a collective body of similarly
injured passivists.238 By denying nudniks the possibility of publicly
fighting firms over four minutes, we reduce the likelihood that others
will learn about such corporate misbehavior. Courts should recognize
There is a broader point in play here: the phenomenon of nudniks is not limited to the consumer
markets context. It appears in labor markets, as we just saw. Counterintuitively, it also appears
in financial markets, as Kastiel and Nili document. Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow
of Corporate Gadflies (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1523, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3520214 [https://perma.cc/784S-XC4W].
235. Troester, 421 P.3d at 1116-17.
236. Id. at 1117. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit referred the issue to the California Supreme
Court. Id. The California court ultimately found for Troester but based its decision on a state-
specific legal issue, namely, that California does not incorporate the de minimis doctrine. Id. at
1125.
237. Starbucks, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 15, 2019), https://s22.q4cdn.com/
869488222/files/doc financials/2019/2019-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/23KF-39NF]
(stating that in the United States, Starbucks employs approximately 218,000 people, with 209,000
of them working in company-owned stores).
238. One could claim that we do not need nudnik-driven litigation in such cases, as the class
action mechanism will be enough to deter firm misbehavior. There are, however, many gaps left
by the limitations of class actions. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3066 (2015) (explaining the inability of arbitration to
address class actions); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 413-17 (2014) (discussing the general shortcomings of
class action lawsuits). In particular, the wave of mandatory arbitration clauses that ban class
actions severely limits the effectiveness of class actions, rendering nudnik-based individual
litigation even more important in drawing others' attention to seller misbehavior. Shapira, supra
note 160.
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these dynamics and apply the de minimis doctrine cautiously when the
issue in question involves a practice that is relevant to many others.239
Finally, and perhaps most contentiously, judges who are aware
of the dangers of nudnik targeting should interpret defamation law
narrowly. If a small subset of consumers drives the diffusion of damning
information on seller behavior, then sellers have incentives and
resources to target this small subset by bringing defamation lawsuits.240
In a separate paper, one of us advocated for consumer reviews to enjoy
a safe haven from defamation law.2 4 1 The argument is that even if some
reviewers exaggerate or outright lie, the intended audience can account
for this possibility when reading reviews.242 In contrast, if a review is
never even written (because of the chilling effect of being sued in
defamation), audiences cannot evaluate it on the merits.243 When we
add on top of that argument the notions developed here-about how
consumers that write detailed negative reviews typically belong to a
small group of "serial" complainers, who have personality traits that
make them identifiable in advance by companies-the case for
protecting reviewers is augmented. Judges should look at consumer
reviews as "issues of public interest" worthy of stronger protection
under the evolving standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.244
3. Lessons for Scholars
This Article highlights the need to shift focus from studying
consumer reading behavior to studying consumer complaining
behavior. Consumer law scholars have traditionally ignored the
insights of the CCB literature and dismissed (or sometimes treated with
hostility) the phenomenon of serial complainers. Yet in today's world,
serial complainers are much more relevant and impactful than serial
readers. The first lesson for scholars therefore concerns the need to
239. For a treatment of the potential concern with opening the "floodgates of litigation," see
Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013).
240. See Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 298 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds.,
2010) ("[N]umerous individuals have been sued for posting negative online reviews.").
241. See Arbel, supra note 82, at 1299-1301.
242. For arguments from the other side, namely, on how businesses should be protected from
irate consumers who write negative reviews, see Barnes, supra note 86, and Lori A. Roberts,
Brawling with the Consumer Review Site Bully, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 633 (2016).
243. See Yonathan A. Arbel & Murat Mungan, The Case Against Expanding Defamation Law,
71 ALA. L. REV. 453 (2019) (studying the audience effects of defamation law); see also Daniel Hemel
& Ariel Porat, Free Speech and Cheap Talk, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 46, 61-65 (2019) (analyzing the
deterrence effect of defamation law on "speakers who choose not to make true statements because
of the extant liability regime").
244. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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study the effects of nudnik behavior: Under what conditions do nudniks
generate positive or negative effects on seller behavior? Once we
identify the areas where nudniks hold sellers to account (and those
where they do not), we can rethink the scope and design of legal
intervention.
The second lesson for scholars concerns the promise and perils
of personalized contracts. Consumer law scholars have traditionally
viewed standard form contracts unfavorably and personalized contracts
favorably: the former rest on compulsion with thin consumer consent,
while the latter come from mutual negotiations, or so the story goes.2 4 5
Against this background, it was intuitive for scholars to view the
increasing trend of personalizing contracts favorably.246 Yet our
analysis suggests that personalized does not necessarily mean better.
Sellers can algorithmically match each consumer with a bespoke
combination of price and terms, based not just on the consumer's
willingness to pay but also on the consumer's willingness to share
damning information about the seller. Such personalized contracts may
not feature much negotiation and comprehension, and, critically, may
hinder the effectiveness of reputational discipline. In other words, the
high levels of tailoring may not lead to better contract terms ex ante
and may actually lead to worse enforcement of seller underperformance
ex post. Personalization comes with underappreciated risks.
D. On Optimizing (Rather than Maximizing) Nudnik Behavior
The theory of the nudnik also suggests the limits of nudnik-
based activism. Some nudniks clearly champion issues of little public
interest or merit. When firms respond to such claims, they incur costs
(and pass these costs on to other consumers). Dedicating scarce judicial
or regulatory resources to frivolous nudnik actions similarly wastes
social resources.
Our proposals in this Section should be read with this limitation
in mind. Our purpose is not to maximize nudnik action, but rather to
optimize it. Some forms of nudnik-based activism are important and
critical to market discipline, while others are unhelpful at best. But
245. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 218, at 362-71 (comparing the act of signing a form contract
to "lay[ing] [one's] head into the mouth of a lion").
246. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Mandatory Rules in Contract
Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (2019) (arguing that personalized protections in consumer
contracts can be efficient); Christoph Busch, Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized
Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309 (2019) (highlighting
the promise of personalized disclosures in consumer contracts); Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note




until future research deciphers which is which, allowing sellers to
disarm nudnik-based activism wholesale is a bad idea. Regardless of
what one thinks about the optimal level of nudnik-based activism, one
should not allow sellers to be the judge.
Take for example our discussion of lessons to judges. Our claim
here is not that all nudnik-based lawsuits should be welcome; rather it
is that judges should resist the natural tendency to look at nudnik-
based lawsuits as vexatious. We claim that the current formulations of
doctrines such as standing or de minimis make them too crude of a tool
to distinguish between positive- and negative-value nudnik actions. As
long as the lawsuit implicates a seller behavior that is applicable to
many other consumers, courts should be more open to the possibility of
letting the lawsuit proceed and screen for frivolous lawsuits in later
stages, perhaps with the benefit of discovery. It is instinctive for judges,
like the rest of us, to view nudniks as petty and vindictive. It is much
less instinctive to consider the positive externalities they provide and
the link between nudnik behavior and market discipline. If nudniks
disappear, market discipline will suffer, and the vacuum will force
courts to delve more deeply into the terms of contracts-a mission many
courts and judges have been avoiding. Allowing nudnik lawsuits to
proceed would not necessarily increase court congestion; it may actually
alleviate it ex ante.
CONCLUSION
Nudniks are an important yet overlooked part of the market
ecosystem. They have unique personality traits that make them pursue
action whenever sellers underperform. Nudniks notice seller
misbehavior that most consumers would not notice. Nudniks publicly
confront sellers who underperform when most consumers would not
bother. Under certain circumstances, nudniks become the engine of
market discipline, solving the consumer collective action problem.
This Article's first contribution is in drawing our attention to the
understudied phenomenon of nudniks. Understanding the
phenomenon-how nudniks operate and when their actions are more or
less likely to generate positive spillovers-is key for understanding
consumer governance, especially in a world where consumers do not
read or understand contracts.
Yet this form of consumer activism via nudniks is under
increasing threat. The Article's second contribution is exploring the
trend of sellers increasingly obtaining data and technologies that will
eventually allow them to identify nudniks and silence them before they
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voice their concerns publicly. Such a development can radically change
the balance of power between sellers and buyers.
While more empirical work is needed, particularly on the
conditions that make nudnik activity most valuable, "leaving things to
the market" is a very deliberate policy choice with important
consequences. One does not have to believe that all (or even most)
nudnik activity is beneficial to see that letting sellers silence nudniks
wholesale may result in worse seller performance. One way of making
sure that you are not called out for underperforming is investing in the
quality of your product; another way is investing in silencing those who
may call you out. When sellers find it easier to invest in appearance
management han in quality controls, consumers are worse off.
This is where the Article's third contribution comes in: outlining
strategies to counter the attack on nudniks and facilitate well-
functioning reputation markets. In the process, we get to reevaluate
longstanding debates; for example, we discuss why personalized
contracts may actually leave consumers worse off than form contracts.
Nudniks also generate costs and big data technologies also come
with benefits, but we highlight here the more understudied sides: the
benefits that nudniks generate and the costs of big data. Without
nudniks, market discipline suffers.
2020] 987

